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CONTEXTS AND CONTENTS OF "FOR GOOD 

CAUSE" AS CRITERION FOR REMOVAL 

OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: 

LEGAL AND POLICY FACTORS 

VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Push has been coming to shove recently in sectors of relation­
ships between administrative law judges and employing agencies, 
with conflicts at the Social Security Administration in the visible 
forefront. The lure and trauma of battle over the power of agencies 
to prescribe and sanction methodologies and outputs for administra­
tive law judges have left in limbo implementation of earlier consen­
sus-oriented proposals for incremental improvements in selection 
and monitoring of the judges l and have, instead, placed priorities on 
• Professor of Law and Political Science, Northwestern University School of Law; 
A.B., Columbia University, 1945; LL.B., Columbia University School of Law, 1948; 
Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley, 1953; D.H.L. (Honorary) Hebrew Union 
College, 1970. Chairman, Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association, 
1977-78. Member, Executive Committee of the American Judicature Society; Associa­
tion of American Law Schools. 
This article was originally prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United 
States. It represents only the views of the author and not necessarily those of the Confer­
ence. The author was Washington and Lee University's Frances Lewis Scholar in resi­
dence while researching and drafting this article and deeply appreciates the limitless 
collegial generosity given him. 
I. Two fine studies bearing on selection of administrative law judges were con­
ducted by Amiel T. Sharon for the Examination Services Branch of the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management's Personnel Research and Development Center and published by 
OPM in 1980 without commentary or implementation. Sharon, An Investigation ofRefer­
ence Ratings for Applicants for Administrative Law Judge (PRR 80-6) (1980); Sharon, 
Validation of tlte Administrative Law Judge Examination (PRR 80-15) (1980) (available 
from Office of Personnel Management, Wash., D.C.). 
The LaMacchia Committee's study a decade ago of opinions and beliefs concerning 
the efficacy and adequacy of administrative law judge adjudication was the most thor­
ough and detailed undertaken to date. Chaired by the Civil Service Commission's then 
Deputy Counsel, the laMacchia Committee sought the views of administrative law 
judges and sampled the opinions of federal agency officials, private practitioners, and 
Bar Association representatives about the quality and quantity of administrative law 
judge work products, relationships between judges and their agencies, standards of re­
view of administrative law judge decisions, and criteria for recruitment of administrative 
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legal jousts before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and 
the federal courts. 
Because the core of the sanctioning power over administrative 
law judges is found in 5 U.S.c. § 752 I (a)'s provision for removal 
"for good cause,"2 this article shall focus on legislative history, pol­
icy issues and precedents that provide its contexts, limit its contours 
and suggest its contents. Adoption by Congress, in 1946, of the 
"good cause" standard for removal of hearing examiners as part of 
law judges. See UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 
ON THE STUDY OF THE UTILIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (LAMACCHIA 
COMM. REPORT) (1974). The findings of the LaMacchia Study were summarized in the 
author's 1975 Report to the Administrative Conference, SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY 
OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS.• RECENT STUDIES RELE­
VANT TO THE DISABILITY HEARINGS AND ApPEALS CRISIS 171-245 (Comm. Print 1975). 
An Advisory Committee on Administrative Law Judges was established by the then 
Civil Service Commission in 1976 to make recommendations to the Commission for im­
provements in managerial effectiveness and utilization of administrative law judges. 
Prior to being disbanded by the Carter administration as a consequence of the adminis­
tration's hostility as a matter of principle to advisory committees, the Advisory Commit­
tee on Administrative Law Judges made four explicit recommendations and called for 
"thorough study" of other key issues not ripe for resolution by consensus. The four 
recommendations were I) that the Civil Service Commission take appropriate steps to 
remove administrative law judges from the coverage of the Veteran's Preference Act; 
2) that the practice of selective certification be abandoned upon removal of administra­
tive law judges from the coverage of the Veteran's Preference Act; 3) that the Civil Serv­
ice Commission reduce the list of types of occupations that do not count towards 
qualifying experience for administrative law judge positions; and 4) that the Civil Service 
Commission modify its requirement of recency of qualifying experience for appointment 
as an administrative law judge. 
On the issue of tenure of administrative law judges, the Final Report of the Advi­
sory Committee stated: 
There was some concern expressed that the [administrative law judge) system, 
with only two removals in the past 30 years, was not designed to eliminate the 
marginal performer. While recognizing that [administrative law judges) were 
protected against annual performance evaluation, consideration was given to 
the thought that [administrative law judge) performance could be assessed at 
the end of a given term appointment, e.g., five years, with the suggestion that 
only the satisfactory performer be offered reappointment. On the other hand, it 
was pointed out that term appointments would be less likely to attract private 
practitioners who would hesitate to change careers for brief periods of time. In 
the end. the Committee felt that the [administrative law judge) tenure issue re­
quired thorough study before APA amendment could be entertained. 
ADVISORY COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, FINAL REPORT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N (Feb. 14, 1978). 
2. 	 5 U.S.c. § 7521(a) (1982). Section 7521(a) provides: 
An action may be taken against an administrative law judge appointed 
under section 3105 of this title by the agency in which the administrative law 
judge is employed only for good cause established and determined by the Merit 
Systems Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hearing before the 
Board. 
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the Administrative Procedure Act3 (APA) is the starting point. The 
Supreme Court's approaches to and decision in Ramspeck v. Federal 
Trial Examiners Conference4 in 1953 will then be analyzed as the 
paramount case involving agency powers over administrative law 
judges. Subsequently, Attorney Generals' opinions and Supreme 
Court observations regarding the roles and functions of administra­
tive law judges are considered contextually as preludes to an analysis 
of current conflicts before the MSPB and the federal courts. The 
author seeks at the conclusion to distill guidelines that can govern 
implementation of the "good cause" standard so as to accord maxi­
mum protection to decisional independence and integrity of admin­
istrative law judges, while at the same time assuring agencies and the 
public of conscientiousness, competence and professionality in 
judging. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND "GOOD CAUSE" 
If the contents of "for good cause" were clear to a certainty, its 
contexts would be superfluous and irrelevant. But reasonable doubt 
existed and continues to exist over precisely the extent of indepen­
dence Congress intended to confer on hearing examiners through in­
3. 	 Section II of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 provided: 
Subject to the civil service and other laws to the extent not inconsistent with 
this Act, there shall be appointed by and for each agency as many qualified and 
competent examiners as may be necessary for proceedings pursuant to Sections 
7 and 8, who shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable and shall 
perform no duties inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as examin­
ers. Examiners shall be removable by the agency in which they are employed 
only for good cause established and determined by the Civil Service Commis­
sion after opportunity for hearing and upon the record thereof. Examiners shall 
receive compensation prescribed by the Commission independently of agency 
recommendations or ratings and in accordance with the Classification Act of 
1923, as amended, except that the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of sub­
section (b) of section 7 of said Act, as amended, and the provisions of section 9 
of said Act, as amended, shall not be applicable. Agencies occasionally or tem­
porarily insufficiently staffed may utilize examiners selected by the Commission 
from and with the consent of other agencies. for the purposes of this section, 
the Commission is authorized to make investigations, require reports by agen­
cies, issue reports, including an annual report to the Congress, promulgate 
rules, appoint such advisory committees as may be deemed necessary, recom­
mend legislation, subpoena witnesses or records and pay witness fees as estab­
lished for the United States courts. 
Ch. 324, § 11,60 Stat. 237, 244 (1944) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (1982». 
The sections of the Classification Act of 1923 held inapplicable to hearing examiners 
by section 11 of the APA concerned criteria for setting rates of compensation and their 
relationships to efficiency ratings of personnel by agency officials. Ch. 346, 55 Stat. 613, 
614 (1941). 
4. 	 345 U.S. 128 (1953). 
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corporation of that standard into section 11 of the original AP A.S 
Similarly, reasonable doubt existed over the weight to be accorded 
hearing examiners' opinions in a judicial application of the substan­
tial evidence standard of review. Justice Frankfurter delivered the 
Supreme Court's decision in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,6 a 
landmark recognition of the purpose and salience of a hearing exam­
iner's decisional independence.7 This reversed Chief Judge Learned 
Hand's painfully derived hypothesis that reviewing judges were 
bound to uphold agency decisions, regardless of a hearing exam­
iner's findings and opinions, as long as substantial evidence could be 
found in the record to support the agency's conclusions.s But just as 
Justice Jackson had to avow in Wong Yang Sung v. McGralh 9 the 
year before, that the AP A contains "many compromises and general­
ities and, no doubt, some ambiguities" 10 and that its "legislative his­
tory is more confiicting than the text is ambiguous,"11 Justice 
Frankfurter needed to point out that Congress adopted the APA as a 
whole "with unquestioning-we might even say uncritical-unanim­
ity"12 and with a palpable lack of that "clarity of purpose which 
Congress supposedly furnishes courts in order to enable them to en­
force its true will." 13 
Compromise heightens capacity for consensus but does so at the 
cost of concomitant ballooning of ambiguity. As Professor Nathan­
son noted, with his typical understatement at the time the AP A was 
adopted, ''the compromise worked out in the drafting of the Act be­
tween advocates of uniformity in administrative procedure and the 
defenders of diversity and flexibility did not always result in a prod­
uct that is crystal clear."14 Small wonder then, that computer-like 
precision in delineating the contents of "for good cause" is available 
only in dreams. Nonetheless, notwithstanding the avowed uncer­
tainties of legislative intent behind key provisions of the AP A, points 
of specific adoption and rejection by Congress established sufficient 
5. Ch. 324,60 Stat. 237,244 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (1982». 
6. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
7. Id. at 475. 
8. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749, 753 (1950), vacated, 340 U.S. 
474 (1951). 
9. 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
10. Id. al 40-41. 
11. Id. at 49. 
12. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 482. 
13. Id. at 483. 
14. Nathanson, Some Comments on the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ILL. L. 
REV. 368,419 (1946). 
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contextual meaning to induce Justice Jackson to write of the APA's 
ascertainable "formula,"ls and Justice Frankfurter to conclude that 
the APA established a "mood" that "must be respected even though 
it can only serve as a standard for judgment and not as a body of 
rigid rules assuring sameness of application." 16 
Insofar as the standard for removal of hearing examiners was 
concerned, the context especially worth analyzing was the contrast of 
section II's language with the proposal of the Attorney General's 
Committee on Administrative Procedure. 17 Congress's rejection of 
the tenure proposal for hearing examiners made by the Attorney 
General's Committee, and the comments about the choice by leading 
members of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, throw sig­
nificant light upon the legislature's· objective in utilizing the termi­
nology of "for good cause." 
Accompanying the Attorney General's Committee's Report was 
"A Bill" putting in the form of proposed legislation, the principal 
recommendations for improvements in the administrative process 
that it believed susceptible of legislative treatment. Section 302 of 
Title III focused on appointment and removal of "hearing commis­
sioners." Nomination was to be by "each agency entrusted with the 
duty of deciding cases", but the power of appointment was to be 
vested in an independent Office of Federal Administrative Procedure 
which must find appointees "qualified by training, experience and 
character to discharge the responsibilities of the position."18 No 
political test or qualification was to be permitted; all nominations 
and appointments were to be "made on the basis of merit and effi­
ciency alone." 19 
Section 302(5) of the Attorney General's Committee's Bill dealt 
explicitly with "term of office" for the "hearing commissioners": 
Each commissioner shall be appointed for the term of seven years 
and shall be removable, within that period, only: 
a) Upon charges, first submitted to him by the agency that he 
has been gUilty of malfeasance in office or has been neglectful 
or inefficient in the performance of duty; or 
b) Upon charges of like effect, first submitted to him, by the At­
torney General of the United States, which the Attorney Gen­
15. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 40. 
16. lIniversal Camera, 340 U.S. at 487. 
17. Arr'y GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMIN. PROCEDURE IN 
GOV'T AGENCIES, S. Doc. No.8, 77TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (1941). 
18. Id. at 196. 
19. Id. 
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eral is authorized to make in his discretion after investigation 
of any complaint against a hearing commissioner made to 
him by a. person other than the agency; or 
C) 	 Upon certification by the Director, after application by the 
agency, that lack of official business or insufficiency of appro­
priation renders necessary the termination of the hearing 
commissioner's appointment. 20 
Although the Attorney General's Committee was aware and 
supportive of the need for hearing officials to be free of any undue 
influence, they deemed seven year tenure sufficient to provide the 
necessary insulation from political invasion. Congress, in passing 
the APA, rejected the Committee's conception of tenure for a specific 
term (as well as its "commissioner" title for hearing officers, prefer­
ring "examiner") and chose instead the "for good cause" standard as 
the only mode of removal. Thus, section II of the APA, as adopted 
in 1946, specified that there shall be appointe~ by and for each 
agency "as many qualified and competent examiners as may be nec­
essary" for proceedings pursuant to the statute: 
who shall be assigned to cases in rotation as far as practicable and 
shall perform no duties inconsistent with their duties and respon­
sibilities as examiners. Examiners shall be removable by the 
agency in which they are employed only for good cause estab­
lished and determined by the Civil Service Commission after op­
portunity for hearing and upon the record thereof.21 
Explaining the policy behind this language of section II, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee stated: 
That examiners be "qualified and competent" requires the 
Civil Service Commission to fix appropriate qualifications and the 
agencies to seek fit persons. In view of the tenure and compensa­
tion requirements of the section, designed to make examiners 
largely independent, self-interest and due concern for the proper 
performance of public functions will inevitably move agencies to 
secure the highest type of examiners. 
The purpose of this section is to render examiners independ­
ent and secure in their tenure and compensation. The section thus 
takes a different ground than the present situation, in which exam­
iners are mere employees of an agency, and other proposals for a 
completely separate "examiners' pool" from which agencies might 
draw for hearing officers. Recognizing that the entire tradition of 
20. 	 ld. 
21. 	 Ch. 324, § 11,60 Stat. 237, 244 (1946). 
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the Civil Service Commission is directed toward security of ten­
ure, it seems wise to put that tradition to use in the present case. 
However, additional powers are conferred upon the commission. 
It must afford any examiner an opportunity for a hearing before 
acceding to an agency request for removal, and even then its ac­
tion would be subject to judicial review. The hearing and decision 
would be made under sections 7 and 8 of this bill. The require­
ment of assignment of examiners "in rotation" prevents an agency 
from disfavoring an examiner by rendering him inactive. 
In the matter of examiners' compensation the section adds 
greatly to the Commission's powers and function. It must pre­
scribe and adjust examiners' salaries, independently of agency rat­
ings and recommendations. The stated inapplicability of specified 
sections of the Classification Act carries into effect that authority. 
The Commission would exercise its powers by classifying examin­
ers' positions and, upon customary examination through its 
agents, shift examiners to superior classifications or higher grades 
as their experience and duties may require. The Commission 
might consult the agency, as it now does in setting up positions or 
reclassifying positions, but it would act upon its own responsibility 
and with the objects of the bill in mind.22 
The House Judiciary Committee repeated most of the Senate 
Committee's observations about section 11.23 
Congressman Walter, in the House of Representatives' discus­
sion of the APA, supported further tie-in of examiner "indepen­
dence" with utilization of Civil Service Commission machinery in 
removal cases: 
One of the most controversial proposals in the field of admin­
istrative law relates to the status and independence of examiners 
who hear cases where agencies themselves or members of boards 
cannot do so. . . . 
It is often proposed that examiners should be entirely in­
dependent of agencies, even to the extent of being separately ap­
pointed, housed, and supervised. At the other extreme there is a 
demand that examiners be selected from agency employees and 
function merely as clerks. In framing this bill we have rejected the 
latter view, as the Attorney General's Committee on Administra­
tive Procedure throughout the greater part of its final report re­
jected it, and have made somewhat different provision for 
22. S. Doc. No. 248. 79th Cong.• 2d Sess. (1937). reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIS­
TORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1946, at 215 (1946) [hereinafter 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY). 
23. Id. at 280-81. 
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independence. Section 11 recognizes that agencies have a proper 
part to play in the selection of examiners in order to secure per­
sonnel of the requisite qualifications. However, once selected, 
under this bill the examiners are made independent in tenure and 
compensation by utilizing and strengthening the existing machin­
ery of the Civil Service Commission. 
Accordingly, section 11 requires agencies to appoint the nec­
essary examiners under the civil service and other laws not incon­
sistent with the bill. But they are removable only for good cause 
determined by the Civil Service Commission after a hearing, upon 
the record thereof, and subject to judicial review. Moreover, their 
compensation is to be prescribed and adjusted only by the Civil 
Service Commission acting upon its independent judgment. The 
Commission is given the necessary powers to operate under this 
section, and it may authorize agencies to borrow examiners from 
one another. 
If there be any criticism of the operation of the civil-service 
system, it is that the tenure security of civil-service personnel is 
exaggerated. However, it is precisely that full and complete ten­
ure security which is widely sought for subordinate administrative 
hearing and deciding officers. Section 11 thus makes use of past 
experience and existing machinery for the purpose.24 
In his Foreword to the brief volume, Legislative History of the 
Administrative Procedure Act ,25 Senator McCarran, the Judiciary 
Committee Chairman, maintained that the Act, "Although it is brief, 
. . . is a comprehensive charter of private liberty and a solemn un­
dertaking of official faimess."26 He may have conveyed more than 
he intended when he noted that this statute has been through "a 
sieve of consideration by the Congress."27 
Professor Morgan Thomas of the University of Michigan main­
tained, soon after adoption of the APA, that: 
[T)he main change [made by the APA) lay in the new indepen­
dence which hearing examiners were to have. To that end they 
were explicitly made free of supervision by the investigatory, pros­
ecuting and administrative staffs of their agencies. . . . Within 
each agency, cases were generally to be rotated so that agency in­
24. Id. at 371. 
25. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22. 
26. Id. at III. 
27. Id. Senator McCarran added that the statute "upholds law and yet lightens the 
burden of those on whom the law may impinge. It enunciates and emphasizes the tripar­
tite form of our democracy and brings into relief the ever essential declaration that this is 
a government of law rather than of men." Id. 
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ftuence could not be made effective through assignment of cases. 
Moreover the Civil Service Commission was entrusted with the 
broad powers which the agencies themselves had previously exer­
cised over their trial examiners. Thus the Commission was given 
authority to prescribe examiners' grades and salaries and to pass 
on promotions independently of agency ratings or recommenda­
tions. And an examiner could be removed only if "good cause" 
were established at a Civil Service Commission hearing. 28 
The guarantee of security of tenure for hearing examiners by 
the Civil Service Commission was, according to Professor Thomas, 
"the appropriate way to ensure that the examiners would be free 
from subservience to their agencies."29 But he probed the scope and 
dimensions of hearing examiners' freedom from subservience to 
their agencies no more deeply than had Senate and House spokes­
men in discussing "for good cause." Did freedom from subservience 
require or countenance freedom from accountability? Did it pro­
hibit all agency sanctions and discipline against hearing examiners? 
Or only those that could prescribe, control or otherwise influence 
improperly hearing examiners' decisions? Can a line be drawn and 
feasibly enforced between sanctions that do and do not intrude upon 
decisional independence? 
III. ApPLICATION OF THE STANDARD 
A. Incumbent Trial Examiners at the Enactment ofthe APA 
The great expectation that the Civil Service Commission would 
be a paragon of fairness and equity, if not wisdom, in administering 
the standards and processes for removal of examiners, was materi­
ally corroded at the program's outset when the issue of retention of 
incumbent examiners serving at the time the AP A took effect had to 
be faced. The APA legislative history's pervasive silence extended to 
whether those who were trial examiners when the legislation took 
effect would have to requalify. Some argued that the lack of criti­
cism of existing examiners in the legislative history meant that they 
were automatically protected by section 11. On the other hand, 
others maintaine~ that the AP A in effect abolished all the old trial 
examiner positions and created a whole new set of jobs for competi­
28. Thomas, The Selection ofFederal Hearing Examiners: Pressure Groups and 'he 
Administrative Process, 59 YALE L.J. 431, 431-32 (1950) (footnote omitted). 
29. Id. at 473-74. 
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tion on equal terms by all applicants.3o 
The Civil Service Commission coped with the dispute by ap­
pointing an advisory committee to assist in drafting rules for imple­
mentation of its AP A roles. That not all members of Congress 
thought incumbent examiners to be role models was made clear by 
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Alexander Wiley in a note to 
Civil Service Commissioner Arthur Flemming in which he insists 
that the Commission demonstrate that the hearing examiners "will 
not be men of leftist thinking, men who don't have complete loyalty 
to our constitutional system of checks and balances, men who are 
not devoted to our system of private enterprise. . . ."31 The Senator 
sought "substantial proof' that the Commission would fill these 
posts with "men of the highest unimpeachable calibre" rather than 
with men who simply have occupied similar positions in the Federal 
Government today, who largely are of one party, and who may lack 
the approach of private enterprise in their work."32 
The Commission deferred definitive action on the status of in­
cumbents until after June 11, 1947, the date the APA provisions were 
to take effect. It authorized "conditional reappointment" of incum­
bents pending final action and, in January 1948, appointed a Board 
of Examiners with the authority to determine which incumbent ex­
aminers were "eminently qualified" and therefore appointable with­
out competitive examination.33 The Board of Examiners consisted 
of two State Supreme Court Judges, one employee of the Civil Serv­
ice Commission, and three practicing attorneys who had held high 
American Bar Association positions.34 Professors Morgan Thomas 
and Ralph Fuchs, the two major scholars studying hearing examiner 
issues at the time, were in agreement that not much was known 
about the details of the Board of Examiners' procedures and prac­
tices in individual cases. Fuchs declared that, "It is not possible on 
the basis of available data to evaluate accurately the quality of the 
30. Id. at 433. Thomas told "The Story of the Qualifying Process" in objective 
detail, see id. at 433-58, and SUbjected it to incisive critique, id. at 458-75. 
31. 17te 150 Hearing Examiners: Chairman Wiley Asks Open Choices lor Fitness, 33 
A.B.A. J. 421, 422 (1947) (hereinafter referred to as 17te 150 Hearing Examiners). In the 
same vein, see generally "17te Hearing Examiners: Undecided Questions as 10 17teir Selec­
tion," 33 A.B.A.J. 688 (1947). 
32. 17te 150 Hearing Examiners, supra note 31, at 422. 
33. Details of the Commission's procedures and practices were described both by 
Thomas, supra note 28 at 433-58, and by Professor Ralph Fuchs of Indiana University, 
who had been a member of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Proce­
dure. See Fuchs, 17te Hearing Examiner Fiasco Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 
63 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1950). 
34. Fuchs, JlIpra note 33, at 747. 
603 1984J "GOO/) CAUSE" REMOVAL 
examinations that were given ... ."3S It was known that investiga­
tion of incumbents was conducted by Commission staff under the 
direction of the Examiners, and oral interviews were conducted by 
the Examiners in panels of two or more.36 But, as Thomas noted 
regarding the investigators' work: "How widely they consulted the 
references (listed by the incumbents) and other persons who at that 
time or in the past had supervised the incumbents is not known."37 
The Board of Examiners' decisions, which were accepted and 
translated into the Commission's own official action, were an­
nounced in a Commission press release on March II, 1949.38 Of 
212 incumbents rated by the Board of Examiners, 54 or 25.5% were 
disqualified. They included 3 out of 5 at the United States Maritime 
Commission, 3 out of 5 at the Department of Agriculture, 14 out of 
41 at the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 10 out of 30 at 
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and 12 out of 48 at the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC).39 The only reasons assigned for the 
disqualifications were "overall characteristics" or "lack of sufficient 
specialized experience."4O 
Objections and protests followed. Every affected agency ap­
pealed on behalf of its examiners. For example, the NLRB com­
plained that: ''The action has eviscerated the hearing examiner staff 
at a time when its caseload is singularly great. . . . The Board will 
be unable efficiently to pursue its regular operations without the 
services of these trained men, many of whom have been with the 
Board for over a decade."41 
The ICC Practitioners Association called upon Congress to in­
vestigate the Civil Service Commission's "violence to one's sense of 
justice and fair play" in the rating of incumbent examiners.42 On 
their own behalf, examiners complained that it was impossible for 
them to appeal effectively since the Board of Examiners had failed to 
identify in what respects each hearing examiner had been found 
wanting.43 
Responding to the criticism, the Commission's staff subse­
35. See iri. at 751. 
36. [d. at 752 & n.62. 
37. Thomas, supra note 28, at 440. 
38. [d. at 441-42. 
39. [d. at 442-43. 
40. [d. at 442. 
41. Quoted by Thomas, supra note 28, at 444. 
42. [d. at 455 (quoting 16 I.C.C. Prac. 1. 706, 710 (1949». 
43. [d. at 445. 
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quently prepared a "Basis of Findings" item for each instance of 
disqualification and listed criticisms such as "lack of fairness," "arbi­
trariness," "immaturity," or "biased in certain respects" in place of 
the previous "overall characteristics." Where disqualification. was 
due to lack of sufficient specialized experience, the Commission then 
specified the experience not credited as being "specialized."44 At­
tacks on the work of the Board of Examiners did not abate, however. 
Indeed, charges escalated, ranging from lack of legitimate authority 
to economic and religious bias.45 The charges, countercharges, and 
evidence introduced in ensuing proceedings indicate that "serious 
misstatements and omisisons" were contained in the 1948 investiga­
tions of incumbents.46 Where second investigations were under­
taken, there were "marked discrepancies" with the reports of the first 
in vestigations. 47 
These events, not surprisingly, led to the resignation of the 
Board of Examiners and to further changes in the Civil Service 
Commission's register of eligible hearing examiners.48 On Decem­
ber 13, 1949, the Commission rescinded its firing of the incumbent 
examiners found less than eminently qualified by the Board of Ex­
aminers, "herald [ing] the end of one of the bitterest behind-the­
scenes fights Washington has seen in recent years. "49 Professor 
Thomas praised the Commission's action as a necessary corrective 
rather than a capitulation to the "temptation to contrive petty ways 
of muddling through and saving face."50 Professor Fuchs cautioned 
that the hearing examiner program would remain a fiasco "if the 
Civil Service Commission continues to permit itself to be pushed 
first in one direction and then in another by outside pressures."51 It 
is "particularly depressing," he added, "that an agency of govern­
ment that traditionally embodies the highest rectitude should appear 
in such a role."52 
The federal government's only experience prior to recent MSPB 
proceedings with evaluation and removal of incumbent hearing of­
ficers turned out to be a model of how not to proceed. From the 
establishment of the Board of Examiners to the final effectual 
44. /d. 
45. /d. at 445-54. 
46. /d. at 452. 
47. /d. at 453. 
48. /d. at 456. 
49. /d. at 431. 
50. /d. at 475. 
51. Fuchs, supra note 33, at 767. 
52. /d. 
605 1984) "GOOD CAUSE" REMOVAL 
"grand fathering" of the incumbents into AP A status, the experience 
was marked by dissonance, ambiguity, vacillation and pressure. The 
problem was not primarily that the "for good cause" standard of 
removal was not deemed applicable by the ill-fated Board of Exam­
iners; it was that both Board and Civil Service Commission es­
chewed consistent adherence to any rational standard for deciding 
which hearing examiners would be retained and which would leave 
as the APA era dawned. Instead, Board and Commission fell "vic­
tim to the winds of the moment. "53 
B. Case Low 
Hearing examiners and the District of Columbia Federal Dis­
trict Court made the contents of "for good cause" a central legal 
issue when the Civil Service Commission adopted rules in 195 154 for 
promotion, compensation and reductions in force of hearing examin­
ers. Ultimately, the Supreme Court's decision in Romspeck rejected 
the construction of "for good cause" put forth by the examiners and 
accepted by District Judge Bolitha Laws when, instead of the narrow 
"personal disqualification" connotation emphasized in the district 
court, the Supreme Court majority adopted a concept of "for good 
cause" in accordance with the findings and reasons of the 
Commission.55 
Ruling on motions for summary judgment filed by both plain­
tiffs and defendants in the action, Judge Laws had granted the exam­
iners' motion and denied the Commission's without any doubt as to 
the meaning of the AP A's section II. Separation of hearing examin­
ers by reductions in force was contrary to the Act because, in part, 
the statute's language, stating that examiners may be removed "only 
for good cause," had to be construed in light of the "significant" 
finding that "reduction in force provisions in earlier drafts of legisla­
tion governing administrative procedure were omitted from the Ad­
ministrative Procedure Act as passed...."56 Judge Laws 
maintained that "the importance of security of tenure to indepen­
dence ofjudgment needs no argument and was clearly recognized by 
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative 
53. Id. at 768. 
54. 5 C.F.R. § 34.15 (Supp. 1951). 
55. 345 U.S. at 143. 
56. Federal Trial Examiners' Conference v. Ramspeck. 104 F. Supp. 734. 740-41 
(emphasis added by coun). aJrd. 202 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1952). rev'd. 345 U.S. 128 
(1953). 
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Procedure. "57 
Whether or not Judge Laws was correct in viewing the Attorney 
General's Committee proposal for a seven year term for hearing ex­
aminers as recognition of security tenure's importance, the court of 
appeals' majority, consisting of Judges Miller and Proctor, routinely 
agreed with him in a two-paragraph, seventy word opinion. 58 Judge 
Bazelon dissented at some length, repudiating in particular the 
notion that "for good cause" was confined to "apersonal shortcom­
ing-malfeasance, incompetence or some kindred disqualifica­
tion."59 Quoting from Senate Report 752 in the APA's Legislative 
History, Bazelon maintained that Congress "put 'the entire tradition 
of the Civil Service Commission . . . to use' when it prescribed a 
new system of tenure for hearing examiners in section 11."60 Crite­
ria for reductions in force "are now a firmly embedded implementa­
tion of that 'tradition.' "61 
In two particularly salient paragraphs, Judge Bazelon con­
tended that the examiners' view of section 11, 
which is adopted by the [district] court, goes much farther along 
the road toward complete examiner independence than Congress 
itself was willing to travel. In enacting [section] 11, Congress 
sought to strike a balance between the need for administrative effi­
ciency and expertise and the need for freeing hearing examiners 
from dictation or intimidation by the agencies. Accordingly, Con­
gress did not adopt any of the extreme proposals to isolate hearing 
examiners from the agencies or insulate them completely from ex­
pressions of the agencies' views. . . . Instead Congress adopted 
the less extreme proposal of removing from the agencies and giv­
ing to the Commission wide powers over the selection, compensa­
tion and removal of hearing examiners. This was the means 
adopted to end ''the present situation in which examiners are mere 
employees of an agency."62 
Judge Bazelon's concluding paragraph enlarged upon the ad­
ministrative discretion dimension of this analysis. Proceeding from 
the premise that much of the attack on the Commission's regulations 
has been "leveled at the possibility they offer for frustrating the pur­
57. Id. at 741. 
58. Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners' Conference, 202 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 
1952). rev'd. 345 U.S. 128 (1953). 




62. Id. at 314-15. 
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pose of the Administrative Procedure Act to free hearing examiners 
from agency domination and coercion," Judge Bazelon admitted 
"that the possibility exists cannot be denied."63 But, he insisted, that 
possibility 
is not so gross as to make the regulations invalid. . . . Congress 
has a right to rely upon the administrators to keep faith with the 
spirit of the statute. The record in this case does not reveal that 
that confidence was misplaced. If individual instances of abuses 
should arise in the future which threaten to thwart the spirit of the 
statute, the means are available to put the matter right.64 
Without mentioning Judge Bazelon's dissent directly, the 
Supreme Court majority accepted his view of section 11 although its 
reasoning was neither as overt or precise. What is abundantly clear 
from the record of the case, notwithstanding any imprecision of rea­
soning, is that the justices rejected the views of Judge Laws and the 
court of appeals' majority and largely ignored additional arguments 
presented in the examiners' brief by Charles Rhyne, Eugene Brad­
ley, Eugene Mullin and Brice Rhyne.6S 
Counsel for the examiners stressed, for example, the difference 
in meaning between statutory provision for removal of personnel for 
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service" and re­
moval "only for good cause." The former clearly authorized a reduc­
tion in force because such reductions, undertaken when work and 
funds were no longer available, could be said to promote the serv­
ice's efficiency. But "only for good cause" required "something 
more than normal civil service tenure."66 
Rhyne further argued that, in section 11, Congress chose delib­
erately to use phraseology different from standard traditional Civil 
Service tenure language; it rejected efficiency of the service as the 
criterion for removal of hearing examiners and chose to provide ex­
aminers with "extraordinary protection" consonant with the unique­
ness of their functions within the administrative process, as 
compared with agency employees in genera1.67 Congress did not 
provide simply that examiners shall be removable for good cause or 
that they shall be removable for good cause only after hearing but 
that they shall be removable "only for good cause," language which 
63. Id. at 316. 
64. Id. 
65. 345 U.S. at 129-43. 
66. Rhyne brief for Federal Trial Examiners' Conference at 74; Ramspeck. 
67. Id. at 81. 
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is "manifestly different and which clearly excludes removal for any 
reason other than good cause. "68 Because good cause "connotes a 
personal disqualification," an employee removed by reduction in 
force procedures has not been removed "for good cause."69 
To cope with the argument by counsel for the Commission that 
the examiners were claiming "lifetime jobs during 'good behavior' 
irrespective of the workload of their agencies or the availability of 
funds with which to pay them," Rhyne maintained that respondents 
never contended that a hearing examiner has an inalienable right 
to retain his salary when there is no work for him to do. . . . Sec­
tion 11 does not purport to state all the reasons for which examin­
ers may be removed. It does state all the reasons for which they 
may be removed "by the agency in which they are em­
ployed". . . . There. . . is no doubt as to the power of Congress 
to remove examiners, or to abolish their positions.70 
Furthermore, the APA's authorization of interagency borrowing of 
examiners and of assignment of them to duties compatible with their 
responsibilities as examiners were the statute's designated ways for 
dealing with workload changes. 7 J 
Counsel for the examiners sought to reinforce their argument 
that removals by reductions in force are prohibited by section II 
with a detailed discussion of the requirements for and prohibitions 
of efficiency ratings. Statutes and regulations governing reductions 
in force traditionally required that efficiency ratings be taken into 
account. 
When Congress forbade efficiency ratings for examiners, it knew 
that efficiency ratings were utilized by the agencies in reduction in 
force to determine not only the relative standing of an employee 
within his competitive level but also the very competitive level in 
which he was to be placed. Congress' action in prohibiting effi­
ciency ratings for examiners is utterly inconsistent with an intent 
that examiners be subject to removal by reduction in force.72 
Without discussing at all the similarities and differences be­
tween the "efficiency of the service" standard and "for good cause" 
standard for removal of personnel, the Supreme Court majority sim­
ply punctured the examiners' and lower courts' positions by pro­
6S. Id. at 75. 
69. Id. at 71. 
70. /d. at SO. 
71. Id. at SI. 
72. Id. at 76. 
609 1984) "GOOD CAUSE" REMOVAL 
claiming that "[a] reduction in force for the reasons heretofore 
provided by the Civil Service Commission and removal of an exam­
iner in accordance therewith is 'good cause' within the meaning of 
[section] 11."73 Echoing Judge Bazelon's faith in the corrective and 
preventive roles of the Commission, the justices maintained that "[i]t 
must be assumed that the Commission will prevent any devious 
practice by an agency which would abuse this Rule. The Rule pro­
vides for examiner appeal to the Commission, so there is opportunity 
to bring abuses to the Commission's attention."74 
At the core of the reversal by the Supreme Court majority of the 
lower courts' rulings, was the justices' rejection of the proposition 
that the APA was designed to make trial examiners ''very nearly the 
equivalent of judges even though operating within the Federal sys­
tem of administrative justice."7s Justice Minton, who wrote the ma­
jority's opinion, regarded this statement in a letter from Senator 
McCarran, then Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to 
Chairman Ramspeck of the Civil Service Commission as "taken out 
of context" because of its having been ''written over five years after 
the [APA] was enacted."76 Thus he refused to consider it illustrative 
of the intent of Congress at the time it passed the Act. Whereas the 
dissenters stressed, as a prime APA objective, giving examiners "a 
new status of freedom from agency control,"77 the majority saw pre­
vention of agency abuses of examiners' integrity and impartiality as 
the key objectives of the Act rather than the achievement of total 
independence. The thrust of the AP A, according to Minton, was 
that hearing officers ''were not to be paid, promoted or discharged at 
the whim or caprice of the agency or for political reasons."78 In 
other respects, traditional personnel practices of the Civil Service 
Commission were to be retained, including "reduction in force for 
lack of funds, personnel ceilings, reorganizations, decrease of work, 
and similar reasons."79 
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Romspeck denied 
APA hearing officers the total independence they sought, it empha­
sized at the same time the obligation of the Civil Service Commis­
73. Ramspeck, 345 u.s. at 143. 
74. Id. at 142. 
75. Id. at 144 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Doc. No. 82, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 
9). 
76. Id. at 143 n.9. 
77. Id. at 144. 
78. Id. at 142. 
79. Id. (citation omitted). 
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sion to "prevent any devious practice by an agency" that would 
abuse examiners' integrity or impartiality or subject them to political 
controls.80 The AP A did not reduce the responsibility of an agency 
to assure that it had a sufficient number of competent examiners to 
handle its business properly, but it clearly put the responsibility in 
the Commission's hands to insure that examiners would be free from 
the influences of politics, whim or caprice. 
The Supreme Court has not, since the Ramspeck decision, con­
sidered directly the scope and contours of "for good cause." None­
theless, its decision 25 years after Ramspeck, in Butz v. Economou,81 
can be cited as an extension of the justices' concern with the inde­
pendence of administrative law judges beyond the majority's posi­
tion in 1953. Whereas the majority in Ramspeck rejected the 
proposition that trial examiners were "very nearly the equivalent of 
judges even though operating within the Federal system of adminis­
trative justice,"82 Justice White pointed out in Butz that "adjudica­
tion within a federal administrative agency shares enough of the 
characteristics of the judicial process that those who participate in 
such adjudication should also be immune from suits for damages."83 
While Justice White's extended observations regarding adminis­
trative law judges in the Butz case could be dismissed as pure dic­
tum, it is more likely that they constituted both an affirmation of 
judicial respect for these hearing officials whose role is "functionally 
comparable to that of a judge," and a hint that the courts might have 
to reassess their present approach to judicial review of agency deci­
sion making if the independence of administrative law judges were 
reduced: 
More importantly, the process of agency adjudication is currently 
structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his 
independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from pres­
sures by the parties or other officials within the agency. Prior to 
the Administrative Procedure Act, there was considerable concern 
that persons hearing administrative cases at the trial level could 
not exercise independent judgment because they were required to 
perform prosecutorial and investigative functions as well as their 
judicial work. . . and because they were often subordinate to ex­
ecutive officials within the agency. . . . The Administrative Pro­
cedure Act contains a number of provisions designed to guarantee 
80. Id. 
81. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
82. Ramspeclc. 345 U.S. at 143 n.9. 
83. 438 U.S. at 512-13. 
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the independence of hearing examiners. They may not perform 
duties inconsistent with their duties as hearing examiners . . . . 
When conducting a hearing under [section] 5 of the APA ... a 
hearing examiner is not responsible to, or subject to the supervi­
sion or direction of, employees or agents engaged in the perform­
ance of investigative or prosecution functions for the agency .... 
Nor maya hearing examiner consult any person or party, includ­
ing other agency officials, concerning a fact at issue in the hearing, 
unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate. . . . 
Hearing examiners must be assigned to cases in rotation so far as 
is practicable. . . . They may be removed only for good cause 
established and determined by the Civil Service Commission after 
a hearing on the record. . . . Their pay is also controlled by the 
Civil Service Commission. 
In light of these safeguards, we think that the risk of an un­
constitutional act by one presiding at an agency bearing is clearly 
outweighed by the importance of preserving the independent 
judgment of these men and women.84 
If these "safeguards" are removed and the "independent judg­
ment" of administrative law judges is jeopardized, it would be only 
natural to expect a revision of present comity and perhaps a rever­
sion by the courts to the adversarial if not hostile dimensions ofjudi­
cial review of agency action of yesteryear. 
The 1980 decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir­
cuit in Nash v. Ca/[fano 8S provided an additional supportive footnote 
to the Supreme Court's emphasis on the independence of adminis­
trative law judges in BulZ. The underlying issue in the Nash case 
was whether an administrative law judge had standing to sue when 
an agency allegedly interfered with his or her decisional indepen­
dence.86 The district court judge had ruled that Simon Nash, a judge 
with twenty-two years experience in the Social Security Administra­
tion's Bureau of Hearings and Appeals,87 had not suffered the in­
jury-in-fact required by the doctrine of standing when Nash was 
subjected to the Bureau's program of monitoring and reviewing the 
decisions of its administrative law judges.88 Among other conten­
tions, Judge Nash complained that arbitrary monthly production 
quotas had been established by the Agency and that what the 
Agency designated as a "quality assurance program" was in reality 
84. Id. at 513·14 (citations omitted). 
85. 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980). 
86. See id. at 11·14. 
87. Id. at 12. 
88. Id. at 13. 
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an attempt to direct the number of decisions awarding or denying 
Social Security benefits. Administrative law judges who deviated 
from ~he "average" SO percent reversal rate for all decisions were 
allegedly counseled and admonished to bring their rates in line with 
the national average on pain of sanctions.89 
While carefully noting that his ruling dealt in no way with the 
merits of Judge Nash's contentions, Judge Kaufman first quoted 
from Justice White in Bulz on the current structuring of agency ad­
judication so as to assure administrative law judges "independent 
judgment."90 He continued by ruling that "express prohibitions of 
performance evaluation and substantive review [by the administra­
tive law judge's agency] contained in 5 U.S.C. § 4301, and appel­
lant's position description promulgated by the Bureau of Hearings 
and Appeals, give his injury the required direct impact upon statuto­
rily created rightS."91 Judge Kaufman closed the panel's unanimous 
opinion that Judge Nash had standing to sue with the admonition 
that "good administration must not encroach upon adjudicative in­
dependence [for] the principal goal of judicial and quasi-judicial ad­
ministration [which is] reduction of delay without compromise to the 
demands of due process [requires for its fulfillment] judicial inde­
pendence [as] one important part."92 
C. Allorney General Opinions and Ihe Borsky-Mahin Sludy 
The dimensions and nuances of administrative law judge inde­
pendence received specific attention from attorneys· general in three 
89. Id. at IS (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 513).· 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 17. 
92. Id. at 17-18. In a Seventh Circuit case decided in February, 1983, the court 
ruled that Social Security Administration administrative law judges do not have standing 
to seek an injunction against an instruction SSA issued to its judges concerning a "new 
policy" for dealing with retroactive cessation of disabilities. According to Judge Posner 
of the Seventh Circuit, ''The instruction ... did truncate the administrative law judges' 
adjudicative discretion," D'Amico v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 903, 905 (7th Cir. 1983); but 
"(tJhe withdrawal, as in this case, of one issue from the factfinding power of the adminis­
trative law judges does not significantly impair 'decisional independence.''' Id. at 907. 
Judge Posner construed Judge Kaufman's decision upholding standing in Noslr as stem­
ming from impairment of the administrative law judges "qualified right of decisional 
independence" and concluded that no significant impairment of such independence was 
wrought here by withdrawal of adjudicative discretion over retroactive cessation of disa­
bilities. Id. at 907. Whereas standing may be appropriate to "housekeeping" cases in­
volving judges, it is not appropriate, according to Judge Posner, to cases involving 
"substantive directives" that put the judicial officers suing to enjoin them "in the position 
of taking sides in controversies" they are supposed to adjudicate impartially. Id. at 907. 
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opinions between 1951 and 1977.93 These, together with a compre­
hensive study in 1960 of hearing examiner roles in the decisional 
machinery of the Social Security Administration by Charles Hor­
sky94 suggest a distinction between administrative law judges' inde­
pendence of judgment and independence of personal behavior and 
work habits. Attorney General Levi's 1977 ruling on the power of 
an agency official to reprimand a judge drew the distinction explic­
itly;9S and the Horsky Report did so implicitly.96 Attorney General 
Ford's 1951 opinion97 and Attorney General Katzenbach's 1964 
opinion,98 on aspects of promotion of hearing examiners, were com­
patible with the Levi-Horsky distinction. 
Faced with the question of whether, as a general rule, employ­
ing agencies may promote hearing examiners, or whether the Civil 
Service Commission was charged with the responsibility of the selec­
tion of hearing examiners for promotion, Peyton Ford ruled that the 
APA's requirement in section 11 that examiners "shall receive com­
pensation prescribed by the Commission independently of agency 
recommendations or ratings,"99 plainly meant that salaries and pro­
motions of examiners should be kept separate from any agency con­
trol. Ford stressed that "the hope of promotion may motivate men 
as strongly as the fear of loss of their jobs. If salaries and promo­
tions are subject to agency control, there is always danger that a sub­
tle influence will be exerted upon the examiners to decide in 
accordance with agency wishes."loo The employing agency is not 
forbidden to make suggestions or recommendations to the Civil 
Service Commission, but the Commission must assume "the full re­
sponsibility for the selection of those to be promoted" and must ar­
rive at its decisions ''through the independent exercise of its own 
judgment." JO I 
Attorney General Katzenbach's 1964 opinion focused on a nar­
row facet of the promotion issue: "When an agency proposes to fill a 
Chief Hearing Examiner's position by the promotion of one of its 
93. See 41 Op. AU'y Gen. 74 (1951); 42 Op. AU'y Gen. 289 (1974); 43 Op. AU'y 
Gen. 1 (1977). 
94. Horsky &. Mahin, The Operation of the Social Security Administration Hear­
ing and Decisional Machinery (1960) (mimeo). 
95. 43 Op. AU'y Gen. 1 (1977); see infra text accompanying notes 104-09. 
96. See infra text accompanying notes 110-20. 
97. 41 Op. AU'y Gen. 74 (1951). 
98. 42 Op. AU'y Gen. 289 (1964). 
99. 5 U.S.c. § 7521(a) (1982). 
100. 41 Op. AU'y Gen. 74,78 (1951). 
101. Id. at 79. 
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hearing examiners, must the Civil Service Commission select the 
hearing examiner who is to be promoted?" 102 Katzenbach ruled 
that, because the designation of the chief hearing examiner "quite 
clearly involves something more than a mere increase in compensa­
tion," and because even the increase in compensation rests on the 
individual's "substantial administrative and managerial responsibili­
ties" rather than on his or her quasi-judicial responsibilities, the 
agencies have the power to appoint an incumbent hearing examiner 
to chief hearing examiner, and the Civil Service Commission does 
not have that power. 103 
It is of course possible, Katzenbach recognized, 
that the carrot of an appointment to a Chief Hearing Examiner 
position could be used to exert a subtle influence on the examiner 
to decide as the agency wishes. However, the same possibilities 
already exist with regard to appointments to membership in the 
agency or to other highly paid positions in the Federal Govern­
ment. Congress recognized that such possibilities can never be 
wholly eliminated; it sought merely to mjnimize them. 104 
If a fine line could be maintained between promotion for mana­
gerial functions and promotion for performance of quasi-judicial 
roles, could a parallel distinction be drawn regarding reprimands? 
Attorney General Levi explicated such a distinction in responding to 
the question: "May the head of an agency of the Federal Govern­
ment issue a reprimand to an [a]dministrative [l]aw UJudge em­
ployed in his agency without initiation of proceedings before the 
Civil Service Commission?" lOS 
Recognizing at the outset that the question presented posed "in 
a new context the recurrent issue of the intended scope of the inde~ 
pendence of administrative law judges from the control of their par­
ent agencies, " Levi stated that the APA provided administrative law 
judges "a certain degree of independence of status but not complete 
independence from administrative control."l06 Reprimands for fail­
ure to report to work on time or to put in a full day did not have to 
await the adjudication of charges by the Civil Service Commission. 
On the other hand, independence of action in the conduct of formal 
AP A proceedings was clearly established by the AP A for hearing 
102. 42 Op. AU'y Gen. 289 (1964). 
103. Id. at 297-300. 
104. Id. at 299. 
105. 43 Op. AU'y Gen. 1 (1977). 
106. Id. at 3. 
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officers. Such functions as regulating the course of the hearing, hold­
ing conferences for settlement or simplification of issues, disposing 
of procedural requests, and making or recommending decisions, as 
set out in section 556(c),107 were typical of roles requiring unencum­
bered independence of judgment. Thus, while not ruling out repri­
mands for purely administrative infractions, "the clear legislative 
prescription for independence of adjudicatory action clearly does 
prevent the use of the reprimand as a means of affecting, controlling 
or sanctioning an administrative law judge's decision in a formal 
AP A proceeding." 108 
In the particular instance, the administrative law judge had 
been reprimanded for issuing a decision in violation of a commit­
ment that had been made by the Interior Department to a federal 
district court judge to withhold administrative action in the case. 
Levi unequivocally construed the issuance of a decision by an ad­
ministrative law judge as constituting an exercise of his APA adjudi­
catory responsibilities: 
The action to be taken was not ministerial; nor do the facts as 
presented involve any formal judicial injunction against issuance. 
Judgment, then, had to be exercised-and a sort of judgment 
which, in the context, was essentially judicial, and was to be made 
by the administrative law judge according to his own understand­
ing and conscience. In my view, therefore, an agency reprimand 
with respect to that decision was improper. 109 
Reprimands for administrative infractions could be adminis­
tered by agencies but were not entrusted solely to agency discretion. 
According to Attorney General Levi, the dangers of abuse through 
using such reprimands as instruments of punishment for ··displeas­
ing adjudicatory activity" required subjecting the judges to the su­
pervision and correctives of the Civil Service Commission. 110 In 
sum, then, reprimands by employing agencies for judgment-related 
action by administrative law judges were forbidden; reprimands for 
administrative infractions were permissible, subject to the Commis­
sion's responsibility to protect against abuse. Levi's opinion made 
explicit an analysis of the contours of the independence of adminis­
trative law judges that was implicit in a study done by Charles Hor­
107. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (1982). 
108. 43 Op. AU'y Gen. 1,6. 
109. [d. at 7. 
110. [d. at 5. 
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sky for the Social Security Administration seventeen years earlier. I II 
Charles Horsky and Amy Mahin of the Washington firm of 
Covington and Burling, having undertaken the assignment from the 
Social Security Administration "to recommend measures that would 
facilitate and expedite the disposition of cases, " determined, by the 
time they filed their report in December, 1960, that "we could be of 
greater service by attempting to insure that overemphasis on speed 
would not be the occasion for underemphasis on fair procedures."I 12 
As a component of relationships between speed and fairness, they 
examined the extent to which agency hearing examiners had been 
accorded the "independence" to which they were entitled by the 
APA. 
Interestingly, the authors ascribed to the Court the position of 
the minority in Romspeck and then proceeded to inquire: "What is 
meant by or included within the term 'independence,' or 'freedom 
from agency control' to use the language of the Supreme Court?"113 
Their complex answer endeavored to draw a fine line between free­
dom from control in fact-finding and freedom from control in deter­
mining policy. 
Horsky and Mahin began their analysis with the proposition 
that, taken as a whole, section II of the AP A "indeed represents a 
significant 'bill of rights' for Federal hearing examiners." 114 But it 
did not establish an unlimited sphere of entitlement to non-interfer­
ence. It did not make an examiner the equivalent of a federal dis­
trict court judge, for example, nor did it confine the agency 
relationship with an examiner to one similar to a court of appeals 
judge and district court judge. They preferred viewing the examiner 
"as a member of a regulatory team-independent of the agency to be 
sure, in the section II sense, but nonetheless subordinate in the sense 
III. Horsky & Mahin, supra note 94. 
112. /d. at 462. Horskyand Mahin were requested by the Social Security Admin­
istration to make a study of: 
( I) Operations under the existing organizational structure of the Office of 
Hearings and Appeals; (2) Practices, procedures and instructions affecting the 
relationship between the Office of Hearings and Appeals, its hearing exaininers 
and appellants; (3) The effect of (I) and (2) upon the independence of hearing 
examiners in deciding cases under Title II of the Social Security Act and upon 
the fairness of hearings. 
Id. at 2. Based upon that study, Horsky and Mahin were to make recommendations "for 
such changes as may be necessary or appropriate which would (I) assure the indepen· 
dence of hearing examiners and the impartiality of the hearing and review process; and 
(2) facilitate the disposition of cases by hearing examiners and the Appeals Council." Id. 
113. Id. at 375-76. 
114. Id. at 377. 
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that his work must mesh with and adapt and conform itself to the 
role and responsibility of the agency."lIS 
The examiner must be "free from outside interference from any 
source" in making determinations as to the facts in each case. "To 
conclude from that, however, that the examiner must therefore be 
free to make his determination as to the decision in every case free 
from similar interference is to ignore the basic distinction between 
facts, on the one hand, and law and policy of the agency, on the 
other."116 Implementation of basic policy set by Congress is the 
province of the agency through rule making or through a course of 
decisions. The only time an examiner is justified in making policy 
decisions is "when the policy of the agency has not yet been defined 
in the circumstances with which he must deal."117 
The examiner's independence, and the safeguards to that inde­
pendence contained in section II relate not to matters of law or pol­
icy but ''to his judgments in connection with the facts. No matter 
how unpleasant or unwelcome or embarrassing the facts may be to 
an agency, the examiner must be free from any pressures which 
would color or distort his report of them." 1 18 Thus, a request to an 
examiner to submit his decision to the agency for comment before 
releasing it is clearly "unwise and improper." 1 19 But efforts to im­
prove the quality and "reasonable productivity" of examiners can be 
undertaken through "post-reviews." 
Although Horsky & Mahin believed that the agency had the 
power and responsibility to improve the performance of deficient ex­
aminers, including increasing their disposition rate, they were op­
posed to "norms which are set across the board for hearing 
examiners generally and norms derived from fixed quotas set in ad­
vance."120 They suggested, without drawing any conclusion regard­
ing its relationship to removal, that a distinction be drawn 
between the examiner who is producing to the limit of his capacity 
and producing far less than the average examiner and the exam­
iner who is likewise producing far less but for reasons of inatten­
tion to his work, poor work habits, inefficient use of his clerical 
assistants, unwillingness to seek advice or help on problems where 
lIS. Id. at 379. 
116. Id. at 381. 
117. Id. at 382. 
118. Id. at 383. 
119. Id. at 390. 
120. Id. at 398. 
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advice and help are available and useful, and the like. 121 
The Attorney Generals' opinions and the Horsky-Mahin study 
contributed authoritative analysis and contextual substance to the 
contours of the "independence" of administrative law judges but 
they failed to come to grips with what constitutes "for good cause" 
when proceedings for suspension or removal of administrative law 
judges are commenced. 
D. Merit Systems Protection Board 
The first determination by the Civil Service Commission of 
whether particular deficiencies in performance by a hearing officer 
met the "for good cause" standard of removal was undertaken in 
1978. While that case was pending, the adjudicatory authority of the 
Civil Service Commission was transferred to the new Merit Systems 
Protection Board (MSPB). Action against an administrative law 
judge was initiated by the Director of the Office of Hearings and 
Appeals of the Social Security Administration (SSA) on grounds 
that the judge had conducted an unauthorized hearing after the Bu­
reau's Appeals Council had removed that case from his jurisdiction. 
Further, the judge had refused to deliver case files after official re­
quests to do so, and presided over cases with acute partiality and 
lack of judicial temperament. After a hearing before the MSPB's 
administrative law judge, a comprehensive "recommended decision" 
was issued against the SSA judge in December 1978, finding that 
"good cause has been established for the removal."122 
The SSA judge relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in 
BulZ for the contention that an administrative law judge was not 
answerable in any respect for conduct involving the performance of 
duties in officially assigned cases. The MSPB's judge rejected this 
defense, stating that "the respondent confuses judicial independence 
with judicial immunity." Although it is "almost a universal rule" 
that a judge cannot be removed because of errors or mistakes in 
judgment, nothing in the APA or in the Butz opinion "can be con­
strued as precluding removal of an administrative law judge for mis­
conduct, incompetence or other failings in the performance of 
adjudicatory duties."123 
121. Id. at 397. 
122. In re Chocallo, 2 M.S.P.B. 23, 70 (1980) (McCanhey, J., recommended deci­
sion) (memorandum opinion and order of the Merit Systems Protection Board, 2 
M.S.P.B. 20 (1980». 
123. Id. at 27. 
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Citing the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Con­
duct as professional recognition of the propriety of disciplinary ac­
tion for judicial misconduct,124 the MSPB's judge concluded that 
conducting a hearing and issuing a decision after jurisdiction legally 
had been taken away and refusal to comply with orders to deliver 
case files became "the antithesis of law and order which the judge 
personifies...."125 In addition, the MSPB's judge found that the 
SSA judge had displayed, in another specific case, a "truly startling 
example of intemperate judicial conduct" in refusing to accord rea­
sonable opportunity for the designated attorney to be heard and to 
represent the interests of his client. Furthermore, respondent "mis­
used the hearing process" by conducting a unilateral inquiry into 
privileged communications between attorney and client. Other man­
ifestations of "fiagrant and uncontrolled bias" by the SSA judge 
were found in the use of sarcastic and scathing language to denounce 
the attorney's veracity, intelligence, and emotional soundness. 126 
Each of the foregoing actions was found to constitute "good 
cause" for removal. The MSPB's judge was careful to note nonethe­
less, that removal proceedings based upon events in the hearing 
room should be reserved for serious improprieties, fiagrant abuses, 
or repeated breaches of acceptable standards of judicial behavior: 
"The Commission is not constituted to serve as a performance evalu­
ation board. . . to decide whether isolated remarks or rulings made 
by an administrative law judge in the course of a hearing measure up 
to some undefined ideal expected of those who conduct proceedings 
under the Administrative Procedure Act."127 
The MSPB commended its judge for a "meticulous well-con­
ceived and correct interpretation and application of the facts and 
law."128 Consonant with its understanding of the major underlying 
purpose of the APA, the Board insisted that "a careful balance must 
be created between judicial independence and judicial accountabil­
ity."129 The Board closed its opinion with the assurance that agen­
cies considering similar actions against administrative law judges 
"will be very carefully scrutinized for adequate bases in meeting the 
'good cause' standard. Imposition of this degree of review in such 
124. See generally CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972). 
125. Id. at 36. 
126. Id. at 62. 
127. Id. at 43, 62-65. 
128. Id.; In re Chocallo, 2 M.S.P.B. 20, 21 (1980) (memorandum opinion and 
order). 
129. Id. at 22. 
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instances is essential to ensure the necessary balance between the in­
terests to be considered and the Board will not neglect its duty in 
fulfilling that goal."130 
In a subsequent case involving alleged personal misconduct by 
an SSA judge for hostile acts toward fellow employees (including 
closing and holding down the vinyl lid of a copying machine on the 
fellow employee's hand while that employee was seeking to retrieve 
her original memorandum that complained about remarks the judge 
had made), the Board sustained findings by the MSPB judge in his 
"Recommended Decision" that there was "good cause" for a 30 day 
suspension of the SSA judge,l31 The MSPB judge ruled that "such 
aggressive, disrespectful behavior toward a fellow employee must be 
disapproved;"132 and the Board agreed. 133 
IV. Low PRODUCTIVITY AS "GOOD CAUSE" FOR REMOVAL 
As chronicled in the preceding section of this article, after a 
lengthy prelude of authoritative contextual, declaratory and admoni­
tory opinions by courts, attorneys general and researchers construing 
the AP A's constraints on agency powers vis a vis administrative law 
judges, overt invocation and application of "for good cause" began 
in 1978 in actual removal and disciplinary proceedings instituted by 
agencies before the Merit Systems Protection Board. It has since 
been gathering steam. The steam is currently being generated at full 
throttle as, for the first time since adoption of the APA, the profes­
sional fate of some administrative law judges hinged on whether "for 
good cause" is held to be satisfied by proving that they consistently 
produced fewer decisions per month than the average produced by 
their peers in the agency and failed, after notice and alleged oppor­
tunity to do so, to improve their yield of decided cases. 
The proceedings instituted in SSA v. Goodman 134 by the De­
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) against SSA Judge 
Robert W. Goodman is a prototype that warrants explication. The 
charge against Judge Goodman by the Office of Hearings and Ap­
peals of the Social Security Administration, filed on April 23, 1982, 
was that: 
130. Id. 
131. In re Glover, 2 M.S.P.B. 73 (1980) (recommended decision) (memorandum 
opinion and order, 2 M.S.P.B. 71 (1980». 
132. Id. at 80. 
133. Id.;/n re Glover, 2 M.S.P.B. 71, 72 (1980) (memorandum opinion and order). 
134. No. HQ75218210015 (MSPB Apr. 6, 1983) (recommended decision), rev'd, 
No. HQ75218210015 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984). 
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Goodman's productivity level is, and has been for some time, 
unacceptably low. This inefficiency in the conduct of his official 
duties, resulting from his failure to increase his output to a mini­
mally acceptable level of productivity, has contributed to undue 
delays experienced by claimants awaiting a hearing decision 
under section 205(b) of the Social Security Act and is detrimental 
to the efficiency of the service. l3S 
The charge equated "inefficiency" with "unacceptably low" 
productivity, and "for good cause" with "inefficiency" in the conduct 
of official duties and detriment to "efficiency of the service." His 
productivity was deemed "unacceptably low" because his 1980 aver­
age of 15.6 dispositions per month was far below the average of 30 
dispositions per month maintained by all the SSA judges who were 
on duty during the fiscal year. For fiscal year 1981 Goodman's aver­
age was 15.8 dispositions per month compared with an average of 32 
for all SSA judges. In addition to his "unacceptably low" disposi­
tion rate, Goodman was alleged also to have "failed to carry a mini­
mally acceptable workload." His annual average monthly 
"pending" for 1981 was 64 compared with 178 for all SSA judges. 
This placed an "unfair, unwarranted burden on the other adminis­
trative law judges and delays the processing of all social security 
claims within the hearing office."136 
Goodman maintained that the complaint should be dismissed 
on three primary grounds: the action subjected him to a "perform­
ance rating" contrary to APA's section 4301(2)(0);137 it violated the 
Act's "for good cause" standard codified in section 7521;138 and it 
violated the 1978 settlement agreement executed by SSA after the 
challenge by administrative law judges to establishment of workload 
goals in Bono v. United States Social Security Administration .139 
Even if standards could legally be established to measure the per­
135. Id. at A-I app. ("Details of the Charge Against Judge Goodman") (Reidy, J., 
recommended decision). 
136. Id. at A-2 app. 
137. 5 U.S.c. § 4301(2)(0) (1982). 
138. Id. § 7521. 
139. Civ. No. 77-0819-CV-W-4 (W.O. Mo. 1979). Judge Bono filed the Brief of 
the Association of Administrative Law Judges and Request for Opponunity to Panici­
pate in Oral Hearing in suppon of Judge Goodman, August 25, 1983. Not surprisingly, 
he contended, inter alia, that the SSA's acts leading to and culminating in the filing of the 
charges against Judge Goodman were "in violation of specific provisions of the APA, the 
Federal OPM Personnel Regulations penaining to [administrative law judges], and the 
agency's acknowledged policy of prohibiting announcements of quotas or goals of pro­
duction to [administrative law judges] in its employ, and its agreement entered into in 
July 1979 to refrain from establishing quotas and goals in numbers." Brief at 14, Bono. 
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formance of administrative law judges, the complaint was defective, 
according to Goodman, because no standard had ever been submit­
ted for approval to the Office of Personnel Management or has ever 
been made known to him. l40 
A hearing on the charges was held before MSPB Administrative 
Law Judge Edward J. Reidy over five days in September and Octo­
ber 1982, and Judge Reidy issued his "recommended decision" on 
April 6, 1983.141 Reidy rejected Goodman's contentions as to the 
legitimacy and validity of the action against him. The MSPB judge 
proceeded by recommending that Goodman be removed from serv­
ice as an administrative law judge because his persistent inefficiency 
as manifested by a production record far below average and by his 
failure to improve it or to offer a satisfactory explanation for it, con­
. stituted "good cause" for removal. Judge Reidy suggested at the 
same time that Goodman be retained as an HHS employee but that 
he be transferred to a position better suited to his skills. Although he 
couched his conclusions in the "belief that respondent's position is 
one of distinction and authority, not of subservience and that, if any­
thing, his obligations are greater, not lesser, on account of his sta­
tus,"142 Judge Reidy rejected quickly Judge Goodman's arguments 
that APA's sections 4301(2)(0) and 7521 were violated by proceed­
ing against him based upon performance-related grounds rather 
than conduct-related grounds. Admitting that Judge Goodman was 
"industrious," "conscientious," "articulate" and "conducts his hear­
ings in a professional manner," 143 Reidy found, nonetheless, that 
striking the necessary balance between judicial independence and ju­
dicial accountability, consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Ramspeck, required rejection of the "attenuated interpretation" of 
"for good cause" pressed by Goodman. "Good cause is not analo­
gous to good behavior."I44 Nothing in section 7521 prevents action 
against an administrative law judge "merely because the action is 
performance based."14s Given the language of section 4301(2)(D), 
Judge Goodman's performance "cannot be measured against any 
standards or critical elements that are performance standards which 
form the basis for determining unacceptable performance under 
Chapter 43;" but "his performance may properly be considered to 
140. Goodman, No. HQ75218210015, slip op. at 6 (recommended decision). 
141. Id. 
142. !d. at 20 n.9. 
143. Id. at 20. 
144. Id. at 22. 
145. Id. at 32. 
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ascertain whether he had been so inefficient that good cause for his 
removal has been manifested under [section] 7521."146 
In concluding that performance-related removals pursuant to 
chapter 75, as distinguished from Chapter 43, have been upheld, 
Judge Reidy cited two 1982 Court of Appeals decisions, Drew v. De­
partment ojthe Navy 147 and Darby v. IRS 148 without further discus­
sion. "What this complaint involves, I conclude, is a performance­
related charge filed consistent with the 'only for good cause' provi­
sions of [section] 7521"; the complaint "is not rooted in a perform­
ance evaluation or rating tied to specified criteria established in an 
agency performance appraisal system within the contemplation of 
Chapter 43 actions."149 
With regard to the Bono settlement, Judge Reidy first ques­
tioned whether the MSPB was "the forum wherein the power to er.­
force that settlement resides"; ISO but then, assuming arguendo that it 
was, he found "no desecration of that agreement." The key para­
graph in the settlement provided that SSA's Office of Hearings and 
Appeals (OHA) "will not issue directives or memoranda setting any 
specific number of dispositions by [administrative law judges] as 
quotas or goals."151 Reidy found that the complaint against Good­
man was not for failure to make a specific number of dispositions as 
quotas or goals, but for failure to improve his yield, given ample 
time and encouragement. 152 Goodman's persistently low productiv­
ity, not his failure to meet a particular level of dispositions per 
month, was what had placed him "in a category of [administrative 
law judges] whose work habits and production shortcomings war­
ranted exploration" and, after sustained failure to improve or to of­
fer an adequate explanation for not improving, made him one of 
four SSA judges against whom charges were brought. ls3 
Having determined that performance-related charges could 
constitute good cause for removal under section 7521, Judge Reidy 
focused on the standard of proof necessary to establish good cause. 
He construed the MSPB's ruling in In re Chocallo, 154 albeit a con­
146. Id. 
147. 672 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
148. 672 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
149. Goodman, No. HQ75218210015. slip op. at 33 (recommended decision). 
150. Id. at 27. 
151. Id. (quoting the 1978 settlement agreement. see supra notes 136-38 and ac­
companying text). 
152. Id. at 29. 
153. Id. at 29-30. 
154. 2 M.S.P.B. 23 (1980); see supra text accompanying notes 122-30. 
624 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:593 
duct case on its facts, to signal and approve of removal actions 
grounded on charges of inefficiency and to require the showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that any judge proceeded against was 
not "merely sub-par or imperfect," but manifested "substantial and 
identifiable deficiencies."lss Applied to Goodman, 
it must be established that his productivity is so unacceptly low 
such that the Board is entirely satisfied that the showing made 
warrants removal in the interest of promoting the efficiency of the 
service. Anything less than a serious deficiency or a compelling 
showing as a grounds for dismissal would not only fall shy of good 
cause but smack of an impermissible intrusion into the indepen­
dence of [administrative law judgesJ.ls6 
Judge Reidy reviewed low productivity, lack of adequate justifi­
cation and failure to improve even slightly through counseling and 
offers of assistance, and noted that Goodman's "supervisors have 
lost confidence in his ability to perform adequately the duties of his 
position."ls7 Taking notice that Goodman's answers at the hearing 
were "in more detail than the questions required and more wordy 
than the interrogator desired,"ls8 Judge Reidy concluded that, given 
its swollen workload, Goodman's inability to meet the growing de­
mands of the job was a burden the agency could not efficiently en­
dure. While he encouraged HHS "to ascertain if there might be 
another assignment whereby the skills and diligence of Judge Good­
man might be utilized,"ls9 he still urged the MSPB to 
enter an order finding that the preponderant evidence forcefully 
shows that respondent's productivity level has been unacceptably 
low revealing inefficiency in the conduct of his official duties so as 
to warrant the removal of Robert W. Goodman from employment 
with the federal government, and that such removal will promote 
the efficiency of the service. l60 
The MSPB set oral argument for September 22, 1983 for its 
hearing in the Goodman case. 161 The agency's Notice of Hearing 
instructed participants that briefs submitted should be limited to 
four issues, two of which focused on the Board's authority and dis­
155. Goodman, No. HQ75218210015, slip op. at 34 (recommended decision). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 42. 
158. Id. at 36 n.l7. 
159. Id. at 42. 
160. Id. at 44. 
161. 48 Fed. Reg. 33,946-47 (July 26, 1983). 
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cretion to specify the sanction to be applied when "good cause" had 
been found under section 7521. The two key issues bearing on the 
content and application of "for good cause" were: 
What is the relationship, if any, of the "good cause" standard of 
[section] 7521(a) to the "efficiency of the service" standard of [sec­
tion] 7513 and/or to the "good behavior" standard of Article III of 
the [United States] Constitution? If low productivity may consti­
tute good cause for removal of an administrative law judge, what 
evidence must the employing agency introduce in order to meet its 
burden of proof?162 
Counsel for Judge Goodman-John Bodner, Albert Cornelison 
and Lewis Barr of Howrey and Simon-repeated the earlier argu­
ments that the charges were disguised performance ratings of admin­
istrative law judges and thus forbidden by law; that they violated the 
Bono settlement; and that, even assuming "inefficiency" could be 
"good cause," the conclusion that Goodman was inefficient was un­
supported by any preponderance of the evidence. In addition, coun­
sel contended that Goodman was denied due process in the hearing 
before Judge Reidy by virtue of being precluded from litigating fully 
the issue of inefficiency. They also urged that dismissal was much 
too severe a penalty, in any event, because Goodman "served with 
distinction for more than a decade, . . . [had] never been criticized 
for the handling of a single case, [had] followed OHA's own guide­
lines for [administrative law judges] and [had] sought only to assure 
that claimants receive the full and fair hearings and the adequate 
written decisions required by law."163 Finally, they cited this 
writer's testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Governmen­
tal Affairs for the proposition that administrative law judges perform 
judicial functions that parallel within the administrative process the 
roles of our other federal judges within the broader governmental 
process and warrant similar protection against pressures and 
influences. 164 
On the issue of the evidence that must be introduced if low pro­
162. Id. at 33,946. 
163. Respondent's Request to Participate in Oral Argument and Supporting Mem­
orandum at 3, Goodman. 
164. Id. at II (citing Rosenblum testimony, Social Security Disability Reviews: TIre 
Role of the Administrative Law Judge: Hearing Before the Subcommillee on Oversight 
Management ofthe Senate Commillee on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 91­
92 (1983) [hereinafter Report]. The Subcommittee reached the conclusion that ''The [ad­
ministrative law judge] is the only impartial, independent adjudicator available to the 
claimant in the administrative process and the only person who stands between the 
claimant and the whim of agency bias and policy." Repor/, at 38. 
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ductivity legitimately could be deemed "good cause," counsel for 
Goodman insisted, citing Professor Mashaw's studies of Social Se­
curity Hearings andAppeals 16S and Bureaucratic Justice 166 as key au­
thorities, that there must be some objective, pre-formulated standard 
against which to judge an administrative law judge's performance,167 
Counsel maintained that "OHA should have conducted a study, or 
compiled empirical support to show that Judge Goodman was in­
deed inefficient."168 Goodman's actual case production rate was "un­
fairly compared with an abstract national average statistical rate," 169 
which was "skewed" against Judge Goodman because it was "de­
rived, in large measure, from the output of high-producing [adminis­
trative law judges] who [did] not properly fulfill their duties as 
[administrative law judges]."17o In any event, Goodman's counsel 
urged, the agency must notify its judges regarding case production 
standards by which their productivity will be measured, and must be 
reasonably responsive to the requests and suggestions of the admin­
istrative law judge for assistance in raising his or her production rate. 
Goodman's request for a second hearing assistant, instead of a deci­
sion writer as most administrative law judges were given, was ig­
nored, except for one brief interim period. l7l 
The brief filed by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
was especially interesting because, while it concurred in Judge 
Reidy's finding "that the complainant [had] instituted proper re­
moval actions against respondent and that good cause was estab­
lished to warrant respondent's removal from his position of 
administrative law judge pursuant to [section] 7521,"172 it also as­
serted as "inappropriate" the removal of administrative law judges 
pursuant to an "efficiency ofthe service standard."173 Decisions like 
Ramspeck "clearly differentiate subordinate and semi-independent 
administrative law judges from life tenured federal judges." Simi­
165. J. MASHAW, SSA HEARINGS AND ApPEALS (1978). 
166. J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983). 
167. Respondent's Request to Participate in Oral Argument and Supporting Mem­
orandum, at 12-15, Gooliman. Invoked in particular was Professor Mashaw's statement 
that: "If the quality of performance is to be judged, there obviously must be some stan­
dard against which to judge it. The more specific and objective the goals of the organiza­
tion can be made, the easier it will be to determine whether or not performance meets 
expectations." Iii. at 12 (quoting J. MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 149 (1983». 
168. Iii. 
169. Iii. at 13. 
170. Iii. To the same effect see ill. at 13 n.3, 15 n.7. 
171. /d. at 15-16. 
172. Brief of Office of Personnel Management at 3, Goodman. 
173. Iii. at 14. 
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larly, the "good cause" and "efficiency of the service" standards were 
"developed independent of one another."174 The OPM brief did not 
undertake to analyze the compatibility with these legal views of 
Judge Reidy's invocations of "efficiency of the service" concomi­
tantly or exchangeably with "good cause." 
The Merit Systems Protection Board issued a unanimous final 
decision in the Goodman case on February 6, 1984, ruling that the 
"record in this case does not reveal the existence of good cause."17S 
Although the Board determined that "there is no generic prohi­
bition to the filing of this charge,"176 and did not employ terms of 
endearment to evaluate "the unreasonably methodical manner in 
which the respondent handled his cases," 177 it concluded that the 
agency's evidence "did not prove the agency's charge that respon­
dent had failed to achieve a minimally acceptable level of productiv­
ity."178 That Judge Goodman's case dispositions were shown to 
have been half the national average was not adequate proof of unac­
ceptably low productivity "[i]n the absence of evidence demonstrat­
ing the validity of using its statistics to measure comparative 
productivity." 179 Especially in light of agency acknowledgement 
that its cases "did vary in difficulty" and "are not fungible,"lso na­
tion-wide case disposition averages could not be relied upon as 
guides for measuring reasonable productivity. "Where, as here the 
agency's entire case rests upon comparative statistics, proof of their 
validity is an essential element of the agency's case."ISI 
Issues identical to those raised before the MSPB in the Good­
man case have been raised in Federal court litigation,ls2 and in an­
other MSPB case against an SSA judge, SSA v. Balaban .IS3 
Stanley M. Balaban, an SSA judge in the Long Beach, Califor­
174. Id. 
175. SSA v. Goodman, No. HQ75210015, slip op. at 19 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984). 
176. Id. at 15. 
177. Id. at 5. 
178. Id. at 16. 
179. Id. at 17. 
180. Id. at 18. 
181. Id. at 19. 
182. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d \0 (2d Cir. 1980), raised such issues but only the 
question of standing has been resolved thus far. Examples of pending cases are Nash v. 
Heckler, Civ. No. 78-281 (W.D.N.Y. filed May 30,1978) and Association of Admin. Law 
Judges v. Heckler, No. 83-0124 (D.D.C. heard Mar. 5, 1984). See also Judge Simon 
Nash's observations on these issues in his Brief by Intervenor in Support of Respondent. 
Goodman. 
183. No. HQ752812100014 (MSPB Feb. 22. 1983). cerro denied. \03 S. Ct. 128 
(1983). 
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nia office was, like Goodman, charged with an "unacceptably low 
level of productivity" in fiscal years 1980, 1981 and part of 1982, as 
compared with the average number ofdispositions by all administra­
tive law judges in the Social Security Administration. l84 In rejecting 
Balaban's motion to dismiss, which challenged the legitimacy of re­
moval proceedings based on performance ratings under sections 
4301(2)(0) and 5721 and contended the proceeding against him vio­
lated the Bono settlement185 (as had Goodman),186 MSPB Judge 
John J. McCarthy phrased the agency's burden of proof slightly dif­
ferently than did Judge Reidy in his recommended decision in the 
Goodman case. Judge Reidy placed the burden on the agency to 
establish, by a "preponderance of the evidence," that the administra­
tive law judge failed to increase his unacceptably low productivity 
after notice and opportunity.187 Judge Reidy subsequently inte­
grated the preponderance test with satisfaction by the MSPB "that 
the showing made warrants removal in the interest of promoting the 
efficiency of the service."188 Judge McCarthy maintained that the 
"good cause" requirement for actions against administrative law 
judges was "similar" to the "efficiency of the service" standard appli­
cable to other federal employees,189 but he avoided classifying the 
standard of proof as a "preponderance of the evidence." Rather, he 
seemed to favor requiring, an "obvious and severe" test for perform­
ance failure that warranted a conclusion the administrative law 
judge was "grossly incompetent or inefficient."I90 
In order to draw the requisite line between acceptable and unac­
ceptable administrative law judge performance, the MSPB required 
"evidence of the nature and difficulty of the work and the conditions 
affecting the productivity of ORA judges," McCarthy maintained. 191 
A "simplistic answer" to the question of when the level of perform­
ance should be c-.onsidered unsatisfactory would be that 
removal of less efficient judges and retention of only the more pro­
184. His 1980 average was 18.2 cases per month. 15.3 in 1981. and 13.2 in the first 
five months in 1982. By comparison. the national monthly average was 30 cases in 1980 
and 32 in 1981. Id. at 3. 
185. Id. at 16-17. 
186. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. 
187. Goodman. No. HQ75218210015. slip op. at 17 (recommended decision). 
188. Balaban. No. HQ752812100014. slip op. at 34. Judge Reidy reiterated appli­
cability of the preponderance requirement and relevance of the efficiency of the service 
standard at the end of his recommended decision. Id. at 43-44. 
189. Id. at 10. 
190. Id. at IS. 
191. Id. 
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ductive judges would increase "the efficiency of the service" and 
satisfy the "good cause" requirement of section 7521. But such an 
approach to the issue would not take into account the concept of 
independence which all the interested parties acknowledge to be 
an important factor. A more valid approach, reasonable in fact 
and in law, might require a "strong" showing of inefficiency to 
justify the extreme sanction of removal. Arguably, the failure in 
performance, i.e., low productivity, should be so obvious and se­
vere as to warrant the conclusion, absent some other explanation, 
that the administrative law judge is grossly incompetent or 
inefficient. 192 
In addition to the possible differences between MSPB Judges 
Reidy and McCarthy on burden of proof, their equality of certitude 
in dismissing the respective SSA judges' challenges to the legality of 
the proceedings against them was tempered by a difference between 
their interpretations of precedent for the actions. McCarthy's rejec­
tion of Balaban's claims that the AP A and Civil Service Reform 
Act193 barred performance-related actions to remove administrative 
law judges was based primarily on his acceptance as applicable pre­
cedent of the MSPB's language in the Chocallo "mis-behavior" re­
moval case}94 McCarthy then appended to his invocation of 
Chocallo the finding: 
While the principle of independence must be respected when per­
formance-based reasons are advanced to justify removal or disci­
plinary action, the mere realization that an agency may propose to 
the Board that such an action be taken does not of itself constitute 
such a threat to independence as to warrant a general rule holding 
such a proposal to be contrary to law or otherwise barred}95 
McCarthy nonetheless acknowledged that "research of cases arising 
under [section] 7521 discloses no case in which either the Board or a 
192. Id. 
193. 5 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982). 
194. Construing Chocal/o, Judge McCarthy maintained: 

While the case was essentially one involving misbehavior of an administrative 

law judge in performing adjudicatory functions, the Board recognized the ten­

sion that arises between the need to keep the judge free of improper agency 
inftuences and the responsibility of the employing agency to institute discipli­
nary or removal action before the Board for the good of the Government serv­
ice. The Board stated that 'a careful balance must be created between judicial 
independence and judicial accountability' . . . . (T)he board ruled that the fact 
that duties are being carried out within a hearing room rather than an office 
'does not provide an impenetrable shield from appraisal of performance.' 
Id. at 11-12 (quoting In re CbocaUo, 2 M.S.P.B. 20, 21 (1980». 
195. Id. at 13. 
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court has addressed the specific question of whether low productivity 
can justify the dismissal of an administrative law judge." 196 
Reidy also invoked the MSPB's language in the Chocallo case 
in the course of his recommended decision to justify removal for per­
formance-based reasons. He added that the complaint against 
Goodman was "a performance-related charge filed consistent with 
the 'only for good cause' provisions of [section] 752l.and not prohib­
ited by any law or regulation."197 For support, he relied upon the 
court of appeals' 1982 decisions in Drew v. United States Department 
ofthe Navy 198 and Darby v. IRSl99 which upheld the "use of Chap­
ter 75 procedures for performance based removals," as distinguished 
from chapter 43 procedures.2OO 
The Drew and Darby decisions of the District of Columbia Cir­
cuit did indeed hold that removal proceedings under chapter 75 were 
separate and distinct from such proceedings under chapter 43; both 
cases having upheld removals of federal personnel pursuant to chap­
ter 75 after termination of proceedings for "unacceptable perform­
ance" pursuant to chapter 43.201 But citing these cases to support 
performance-based actions against administrative law judges re­
quires an intermediate step that even OPM declined to take.202 It 
requires equating the "good cause" standard with the "efficiency of 
the service" standard, because Drew and Darby involved proceed­
ings, not under section 7521 which requires the "for good cause" 
standard, but under section 7513 which requires resort to the "effi­
ciency of the service" standard. The court of appeals ruled 2-1 in 
both cases that the agency had shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that removal of the employee "would promote the effi­
ciency of the service."203 
Given this explicit tie of the Drew and Darby rulings to the "ef­
ficiency of the service" standard, the only precedent for the proposi­
196. Id. at 11. 
197. Goodman, No. HQ75218210015, slip op. at 33 (recommended decision). 
198. 672 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
199. 672 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
200. Id. at 195-96. Under chapter 43, agencies are required to establish perform­
ance appraisal systems and are authorized to take action against employees for "unac­
ceptable performance." 5 U.S.C. §§ 4302, 4303 (1982). Administrative law judges are 
excepted from chapter 43 by 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(E) (1982). The "for good cause" stan­
dard for administrative law judges of section 7521 is under chapter 75, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501­
7543 (1982). 
201. Drew, 672 F.2d at 200-01; Darby, 672 F.2d at 195-96. 
202. See generally Brief of U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Goodman. 
203. Drew, 672 F.2d at 201; Darby, 672 F.2d at 196. 
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tion that performance-related charges can be found to constitute 
"good cause" in a removal proceeding under section 7521 prior to 
Goodman, is the language in the course of the Chocallo opinion by 
the MSPB, which avowedly was a "misbehavior" case.204 While it 
certainly remains correct as a general rule that an agency's construc­
tion of the statute Congress has charged it to administer is entitled to 
deference, contemporaneity of the construction with adoption of the 
statute is a key justification for the deference. Whether a first-time 
construction by the agency, more than 30 years after adoption of the 
statute, qualifies for deference or invites disdain, is an open 
question.20s 
The degree of deference that the MSPB's quoted language in 
Chocallo warrants should be dependent upon the relevance of that 
language to the facts and ruling in the case, the contemporaneity of 
the language with adoption of the statute, and the consistency of that 
language with positions, if any, previously taken by the agency on 
the point at issue. Regarding the last of these factors, issues of unsat­
204. See supra note 194. On appeal of the MSPB's decision, the United States 
District Coun for the District of Columbia maintained, in upholding the MSPB, that "an 
administrative law judge is not immune from review for procedural misconduct, incom­
petence or other failings in the performance of his or her duties." Chocallo v. Prokop, 
No. 80-1053, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 1980), offd, vacated, and remanded, No. 80­
2518 (D.C. Cir. Feb. II, 1982) (unpublished). According to MSPB Judge McCanhy, the 
remand was for the district coun to explain its dismissal of plaintiffs claims in constitu­
tional ton. The district coun dismissed those claims again by order dated May 3, 1982, 
accompanied by a memorandum opinion. Order denying Balaban motion to dismiss, 
Balaban, slip op. at 11 n.ll (MSPB Feb. 22, 1983). 
205. In Bob Jones Univ. v. United States. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983), Chief Justice 
Burger, in upholding IRS denial of tax exempt status to private schools that practice 
racial discrimination, noted of the IRS interpretation that hadn't been announced until 
1970, "That it may be seen as belated docs not undermine its soundness." fd. at 2030. 
Although this statement by the Coun seems at odds with the author's position in the text, 
the Coun justified the "belated" interpretation of I.R.C. § 501(C)(3)(1982) by the IRS on 
the ground that 
racial discrimination. . . is contrary to public policy. . . . Indeed, it would be 
anomalous for the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches to reach con­
clusions that add up to a firm public policy on racial discrimination, and at the 
same time have the IRS blissfully ignore what all three branches of the Federal 
Government had declared. 
fd. at 2030-32. No similar "firm public policy" is evident to require an administrative 
interpretation that the performance related charges against Judge Goodman are "good 
cause" for administrative law judge removal under section 7521. 
The Supreme Coun's explanation for denying deference to the NLRB's belated con­
struction beginning in 1970 that faculty members are "employees" entitled to the protec­
tion of the National Labor Relations Act seems more consonant with the situation under 
discussion. "[W)e accord great respect to the expenise of the Board," said Justice Powell. 
"when its conclusions are rationally based on aniculated facts and consistent with the 
Act." NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 691 (1980). 
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isfactory productivity as "good cause" were before the MSPB for the 
first time in the Goodman and Balaban cases, and had not previously 
been argued before that agency or its predecessor, the Civil Service 
Commission. Nonetheless, there is at least a question whether the 
Civil Service Commission previously looked with favor on the posi­
tion, a position compatible with Goodman's and Balaban's argu­
ments, that "good cause" removals are confined to disciplinary 
infractions. 
In Benton v. United States,206 a court of claims proceedings in­
volving the question whether a hearing examiner who was involun­
tarily retired for disability was "removed" within the meaning of 
section 11 of the APA and hence subject to the AP A's procedural 
protections, the Civil Service Commission argued that there was a 
clear distinction between a removal for good cause and a separation 
based on an involuntary retirement for disability. According to the 
court of claims' report of the case, the Commission, in implementing 
its argument for this distinction, maintained that removal for cause 
"denotes a disciplinary type of action, whereas involuntary retire­
ment is viewed as a non-disciplinary type of action."207 A judge 
could be involuntarily retired, the Commission maintained, without 
being accorded AP A procedural protections. The court of claims re­
jected the Commission's dichotomy and ruled that disability could 
constitute good cause for removal of hearing examiners. Because in­
voluntary retirement as a result of disability was "removal", the dis­
ability must be established through the procedures prescribed by the 
APA, which, for administrative law judges, was ''wholly different 
from that applicable to 'mere employees of an agency'. . . ."208 The 
court of claims concluded: "We cannot agree with defendant that 
the term 'removal for good cause' has become a term of art in legal 
parlance and that in every case and in every statute relating to civil­
ian employees of the [gJovernment, it means a removal for discipli­
nary reasons."209 
Given the peripheral status of the allegedly supportive language 
in Chocallo to the facts of the case, the uncertainty about consistency 
between the current position of the agency on the scope of "good 
cause" and the position of its predecessor agency a decade earlier, 
and the exposition of the agency's present construction three decades 
206. 488 F.2d 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1973). 
207. Id. at 1024. 
208. Id. at 1025. 
209. Id. 
633 1984J "GOOD CAUSE" REMOVAL 
after formulation of the statute, there is little ground for deferring to 
the MSPB's interpretation. The core issue is not solely one of defer­
ence in any event, for a cluster of interrelated factors bear upon ac­
cepting and applying performance-related standards as good cause 
for removal: essentially statutory and judicial texts and contexts of 
the good cause standard in conjunction with an evaluation of how 
the standard's underlying objectives can most effectively be served. 
v. GUIDELINES FOR DEFINING "GOOD CAUSE" 
The foregoing examination of legislative history, professional 
commentary and arguments before, and opinions by, courts regard­
ing the standard for removal of administrative law judges, indicates 
that the meaning of "for good cause" is plainer in terms of relation­
ships to comparable standards along a spectrum of strictness than it 
is in terms ofdescriptions of formal contents. In prescribing the stan­
dard to govern removal of administrative law judges, Congress es­
chewed both the strict constitutional standard of "good behavior" 
required for removal of federal judges and the loose standard of 
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service"; the latter 
standard authorized traditionally for removal of non-judicial federal 
civil service personne1.210 The obvious inference to be drawn from 
Congress' eliminating the "efficiency of the service" standard and 
adopting instead the noun "cause," as used in the traditional civil 
service standard, and combining it with the same adjective, "good," 
as used in the constitutional standard, is that more than mere 
"cause" that promotes the "efficiency of the service" was to be re­
quired for removal of administrative law judges. At the same time, 
less than noxious conduct falling afoul of "good behavior" was to be 
required. Removal of administrative law judges was not tied exclu­
sively to their behavior. As the Ramspeck case made clear,2l1 re­
moval could be ordered legitimately as a consequence of economic 
traumas such as reductions in force. Presumably, other salient oc­
currences, whose impact on the administrative process exceeds "effi­
ciency of the service" by a sufficient margin to be the equivalent of 
economic trauma, could also qualify as "good cause." 
210. "The efficiency of the service" standard was adopted in 1912 as section 6 of 
the lloyd-LaFollette Act, providing "[tJhat no person in the classified civil service of the 
United States shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as will promote the effi­
ciency of said service and for reasons given in writing..." 37 Stat. 539. 555 (1912). The 
Supreme Court upheld the standard against a claim of voidness for vagueness in Arnett 
v. Kennedy. 416 U.S. 134, 158-64 (1974). 
211. See supra notes 54-81 and accompanying text. 
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The AP A increased the protection of hearing examiners from 
what it had been previously, as the Senate Report made plain, in an 
attempt to render them "independent and secure in their tenure and 
compensation," thus taking "a different ground than the present situ­
ation, in which examiners are mere employees of the 
agency...."212 
The "different ground than the present situation" necessary to 
establish "good cause" for hearing examiner removals had to be 
stricter than that necessary to establish "such cause as will promote 
the efficiency of the service"; "mere employees" already were enti­
tled to that level of protection in "the present situation." No verbal 
alchemy can transmute the "good cause" standard into the stricter 
"good behavior" standard; the prohibition is equally compelling 
upon replacement of legal with prestidigitory techniques to pummel 
"good cause" into the looser "such cause as will promote the effi­
ciency of the service." 
How can the good cause standard be interpreted and applied in 
practice without confining it to purely behavioral delicts that would 
make it the equivalent, in effect, of the good behavior standard and 
without expanding it to encompass every inadequacy in performance 
that warrants removal to promote the efficiency of the service? Some 
matters not yet discussed, including the Administrative Conference's 
1978 resolution on SSA-administrative law judge interactions,213 
Judge Merritt Ruhlen's ManuaPI4 for administrative law judges, the 
Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Campbell v. Heckler 215 and recent 
research by the Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations,216 con­
sidered in conjunction with the earlier analyses of cases, commenta­
ries and contexts can assist in establishing guidelines and monitoring 
borders. 
Resolution 78-2 adopted by the Administrative Conference in 
1978 limned three avenues to improvement of agency-judge relation­
ships in the realm of social security disability claims. Terming its 
recommendations "interstitial and conservative," the Administrative 
Conference endeavored to "prescribe improvements while reinforc­
ing sound practice."217 Relevant to the particular concerns of .this 
212. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22. at 215. 
213. Administrative Conference of the U.S., Res. 78-2, I C.F.R. § 305.78-2 (1982). 
214. M. RUHLEN, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (rev. ed. 1982). 
215. 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983). 
216. Letter to the author from Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations, Ameri­
can Judicature Society (Sept. 9, 1983). 
217. I C.F.R. § 305.78-2, at 99. 
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paper were: 
Recommendations 78-2A2: The Bureau of Hearings and Appeals 
(BHA) possesses and should exercise the authority, consistent with 
the admjnjstrative law judge's decisional independence, to pre­
scribe procedures and techniques for the accurate and expeditious 
disposition of Social Security Administration claims. Mter con­
sultation with its administrative law judge corps, the Civil Service 
Commission and other affected interests, BHA should establish by 
regulation the agency's expectations concerning the administrative 
law judges' performance. Maintaining the administrative law 
judges' decisional independence does not preclude the articulation 
of appropriate productivity norms or efforts to secure adherence to 
previously enunciated standards and policies, underlying the So­
cial Security Administration's fulfillment of statutory duties. 
78-2B4: The Bureau of Hearings and Appeals should make better 
use [of] claimants as sources of information by: (a) providing 
them with available State agency reasons for denial; (b) providing 
notice of the critical issues to be canvassed at the hearing; and 
(c) engaging in careful and detailed questioning of the claimant at 
the hearing. 
78·2C2: The Social Security Administration should devote more 
attention to the development and dissemination of precedent 
materials. These actions include (a) regulatory codification of set­
tled or established policies (b) reasoned acquiescence or nonacqui­
escence in judicial decisions (c) publication of fact-based 
precedent decisions (d) periodic conferences of administrative law 
judges for discussion of new legal developments or recurrent 
problems.218 
Thus, the Conference looked with favor on the articulation of 
appropriate productivity norms, provided that such norms should be 
established "by regulation" and posited on consultations with ad­
ministrative law judges and other affected interests. There is no evi­
dence in any of the proceedings against SSA judges that appropriate 
productivity norms have ever been articulated, let alone "by regula­
tion" or "after consultation" with administrative law judges. The 
other integrative and practicable recommendations for codification 
of precedents and use of claimants for information in a manner that 
could systematize and simplify many disability cases have encoun­
tered recurrent neglect as well. SSA has responded, on the whole, 
with insularity and opacity to the Administrative Conference's pro­
posal for a consultative, cooperative endeavor. 
218. [d. at 99-100. 
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Judge Merritt Ruhlen's Manualfor Administrative Law Judges, 
published by the Administrative Conference, treated administrative 
law judges' obligations to apply agency policy determinations as en­
tirely compatible with maintaining their decisional independence. 
He noted that "[ilt is the mudge's duty to decide all cases in accord­
ance with agency policy."219 Nonetheless, if evidence or arguments 
not previously considered by the agency are introduced "or if there 
are facts or circumstances indicating that reconsideration of estab­
lished agency policy may be necessary, the mudge has not only a 
right but a duty to consider such matters and rule accordingly."220 
Ruhlen described administrative law judge appointments as "abso­
lute" in order to insure independence, though he also recognized 
that the judge is "an employee of the agency, charged with the inter­
pretation and enforcement of its policies and the achievement of its 
distinct mission ...."221 He stressed that the administrative law 
judge has a "strong affirmative duty" both "to try a case fairly and to 
write a sound decision" and "to insure that an accurate and complete 
record is developed."222 
The latter obligation extends, when necessary, to directing 
counsel to research questions of law or policy and directing the par­
ties "to discuss in oral argument, in brief, or in special memoranda 
during the hearing any issues or points he thinks germane. . . ."223 
He may even "have to call his own witness upon essential matters 
not covered adequately by the parties."224 In writing opinions, ad­
ministrative law judges must be aware that "the only way to write 
any document is to assemble the relevant material and the diction­
ary, thesaurus, style-book and guide to citation, and to write, rewrite, 
rewrite and rewrite."22S 
The clear intimation from Ruhlen's observations is that the ad­
ministrative law judge who reworks and rewrites decisions to im­
prove them is performing his obligations properly and is not by so 
doing, furnishing "good cause" for dismissal. Nothing in the record 
of the proceedings to remove the SSA judges indicates that their per­
formance was appraised with regard to insuring that "an accurate 
219. M. RUHLEN, supra note 214, at 79. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 1. 
222. Id. at 3. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. at 95. 
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and complete record is developed."226 
Ruhlen's views of the responsibilities of administrative law 
judges were reinforced by the views of the Supreme Court in Camp­
bell v. Heck/er227 in 1983. In reversing the court of appeals' conclu­
sion that a finding by the Secretary of HHS that the claimant was 
"not disabled" was not supported by substantial evidence unless the 
Secretary showed "suitable available alternative jobs" for the claim­
ant,228 the Supreme Court maintained that the court of appeals re­
lied upon a principle of administrative law that was "inapplicable" 
when the agency, as here, had promulgated valid regulations.229 
When an agency takes administrative or official notice of facts, a 
litigant must ordinarily be given an adequate opportunity to re­
spond.230 "But when the accuracy of those facts already has been 
tested fairly during rulemaking, the rulemaking proceeding itself 
provides sufficient procedural protection."23. Reasons why the Sec­
retary could choose to rely upon guidelines developed through 
rulemaking rather than to present testimony of a vocational expert in 
each case were that the regulations provide that "the rules will be 
applied only when they describe a claimant's abilities and limitations 
accurately" and that the regulations require the administrative law 
judge to " 'loo[k] fully into the issues.' "232 The Secretary conceded 
that the regulations require conscientious inquiry by the administra­
tive law judge but argued that the inquiry undertaken by the judge 
here "satisfied any regulatory duty."233 
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Brennan commented that 
claimant's hearing before the administrative law judge "reflects 
poorly" on the judge's "duty of inquiry" and noted that the Secre­
tary acknowledged this duty. He did not support the court of ap­
peals decision in the case, however, because ''the obligation that the 
[c]ourt of [a]ppeals would have placed on [a]dministrative [l]aw 
UJudges was a poor substitute for good faith performance of the 
'duty of inquiry' they already have."234 Justice Marshall, the lone 
226. It!. at 3. 
227. 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983). 
228. Campbell v. Secretary, 665 F.ld 48,54 (ld Cir. 1981), rev'tl sub nom. Camp­
bell v. Heckler, 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983). 
229. 103 S. Ct. at 1959. 
230. It!. at 1958. 
231. It!. at 1959. 
232. It!. (invoking 20 C.F.R. § 404 (1982), especially §§ 404. 1563(a), 404.944, 404 
subpart P, app. 2 § 200.00(a». 
233. 103 S. Ct. at 1958 n.12. 
234. It!. at 1960 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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dissenter, disagreed with the other justices' conclusion that the court 
of appeals did not question the adequacy of the administrative law 
judge's inquiry at the hearing.23s 
The Justices were unanimous in their perception of administra­
tive law judges' responsibilities for inquiry and judgment. The Sec­
retary could promulgate medical-vocational guidelines through 
rulemaking in order to improve both the uniformity and efficiency of 
determinations regarding the existence of suitable jobs in the na­
tional economy. The Justices, in a footnote, recognized additional 
support for the Secretary's guidelines that "[m]ore than a quarter of 
a million of these claims require a hearing before an [a]dministrative 
[l]aw UJudge.... [t]he need for efficiency is self evident."236 Effi­
ciency was equated with avoiding previously inconsistent treatment 
of similarly situated claimants that resulted from disparities in the 
testimony of vocational experts. The use of rulemaking to formulate 
guidelines in order to heighten uniformity in determining the avi­
lability of work that claimants could perform was applauded by the 
Court. By no stretch of the imagination could one find in the Court's 
decision in Campbell, however, a scintilla of support for the proposi­
tion that agencies can prescribe decisional minima to which adminis­
trative law judges must adhere or face removal. The Justices 
stressed thoroughness and fairness, not quantity, in reiterating the 
obligation of administrative law judges to look conscientiously and 
fully into the relevant issues and to refuse to apply the rules con­
tained in the Secretary's guidelines upon finding that "they fail to 
describe a claimant's particular limitations."237 Conscientiousness 
and thoroughness in probing and weighing issues were seen by the 
justices as positive components of administrative law judge perform­
ance. To switch them into criteria for proving "good cause" for re­
moval of administrative law judges would require that the semantic 
standards of Big Brother in Orwell's 1984238 be substituted for tradi­
tional evaluative norms. 
Does the foregoing analysis suggest that judges can legitimately 
mask indolence through talismanic allegations of conscientiousness 
and thoroughness? Certainly not; for probes of the empirical reality 
or falsity of such allegations are necessary and proper instruments in 
assessing whether removal ofjudges is warranted. Studies ofjudicial 
235. Id. at 1961 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting). 
236. Id. at 1954 n.2. 
237. Id. at 1958 n.ll. 
238. G. ORWELL, 1984 (reprint 1982). 
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discipline by the American Judicature Society demonstrate that the 
time is past-if it ever existed-when judges could claim total immu­
nity from accountability for their conduct and conscientiousness.239 
Research by the Society's Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations 
evidences consistent rulings of removability and orders of removal 
against judges shown to be delinquent in the performance of duties. 
In a letter to this author on September 9, 1983 in response to a 
request for "cases concerning judges who have been disciplined for 
deciding too few cases or for delay in disposing of cases," American 
Judicature Society Staff Attorney Terrence Brooks listed 25 such 
cases, omitting from his compilation "cases where judges have been 
accused of delay together with other, more serious misconduct."240 
Perusal of the reports of the respective judicial conduct organizations 
in each of these cases revealed that the judge subjected to discipline 
failed in some respect beyond the charges leveled at Administrative 
Law Judges Goodman and Balaban-a factor in addition to low de­
cisional productivity was always present. 
A case closest to the allegations against Goodman and Balaban 
involved an Alabama circuit court judge who was found to be "men­
tally unable to perform his duties," after "failing to promptly dispose 
of cases submitted to him and failing to report cases pending deci­
sion before him for more than six months."241 Typical of the charges 
against the judge was the claim that he exacerbated delays by losing 
decrees from time to time. For example, after hearing an automobile 
condemnation case in January 1978, he requested and received a 
proposed decree from an attorney in May 1978. He signed that de­
cree in August 1978 but then lost it in his office for four months. It 
was found in December 1978 and finally filed eleven months after 
the hearing.242 In other cases before that judge, attorneys "repeat­
edly wrote letters and made phone calls" urging the judge to decide 
239. See I. TESSITOR, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS (1978). The American 
Judicature Society's Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations publishes, The Judicial 
Conduct Reporter, a quarterly newsletter, and The Judicial Discipline and Disability Di­
gest, a multivolume work cataloging every reported case on judicial discipline since 
1960. The November 1979 issue of Judicature was devoted to preserving confidence in 
the Commissions, 63 JUDICATURE 203 (1979). With regard to application of the constitu­
tional "good behavior" standard to federal judges, see R. WHEELER & A. LEVIN, JUDI­
CtAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL IN THE U.S. (1979) (study of the Federal Judicial 
Center). 
240. See supra note 216. 
241. In re Powers, slip op. at I (Ala. Ct. of the Judiciary July II, 1981) (unreported 
judgment) (mimeo). 
242. Id. at 5. 
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submitted matters "but to no avail."243 
While falling short of malicious, immoral, or venal behavior, 
the performance of the Alabama judge, and of others removed or 
disciplined in similar cases, included elements of negligence or indif­
ference, such as losing or mislaying case materials, keeping inaccu­
rate records and unwillingness or inability to discharge 
administrative duties as presiding officer, in addition to a failure to 
make timely adjudications. 244 
Although the cases of judicial discipline contained some factor 
of negligence or indifference in addition to low decisional productiv­
ity on the part of the judge, reasonable persons journeying along the 
slipperly slopes of legal argumentation would have to acknowledge 
that decisional productivity can be so low as, without more, to con­
stitute good cause for removal. It is submitted that an administrative 
law judge who presides admirably over hearings and elicits every 
relevant nuance of testimony and data, but who fails over a period of 
time to produce any decisions, negates the title of judge and fur­
nishes good cause for removal. Except perhaps, in Gilbert and Sulli­
van operettas, one who cannot adjudicate cannot be a judge. 
On the other hand, an administrative law judge who adjudicates 
at a pace similar to that at which rabbits multiply could also furnish 
good cause for removal if high quantity was achieved at the cost of 
violating the duty of inquiry and failing to look fully into the issues. 
Analysts of judicial performance should question rather than cheer 
high disposition rates that exceed, over a period of time, likely com­
patibility with full inquiry and deliberation. How should maximum 
and minimum figures be determined for each agency so that a pre­
sumption of good cause may appropriately be imposed for discipli­
nary proceedings against administrative law judges whose 
disposition rates fall above or below those figures? If it can be done 
243. /d. at 7. 
244. See, e.g.,1n re Heideman, 387 Mich. 630, 198 N.W.2d 291 (1972); In re Mac­
Dowell, 303 N.Y.S.2d 748 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); and In re Judges of Municipal Court, 
256 Iowa 1135, 130 N.W.2d 553 (1964) cited by the Alabama court in the Powers casco 
Typical of the other cases noted in the American Judicature Society Center for Judicial 
Conduct Organizations' letter of September 9, 1983 were In re Zcdlar, (Pa. Mar. 1981) 
(unreported order) (mimco) removing a District Justice of Cumberland County for such 
conduct as refusing to conduct hearings on Mondays and after 11:00 A.M. on Tuesdays 
through Fridays and for refusing to come to his office on a number of work days; and In 
re Stafford, (N.Y. Judicial Conduct Comm'n Nov. 12 1982) (unreported judgment) 
(mimco) removing a justice of Newfield Town Court for having "failed to carry out 
virtually all her judicial dutics", including failure to preside over arraignments, trials and 
other proceedings. 
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equitably at all, it must be the product of representative, expert judg­
ment. Compatible with the Administrative Conference's Resolution 
78-2, reliance upon consultations with representative judges, judicial 
organizations and other experts from the profession are far more 
likely to produce fair and feasible criteria than are decrees by agen­
cies acting alone in sovereign isolation. It would be a mockery of the 
vaunted methodology of administrative law to exclude from authori­
tative participation representatives of the individuals and profes­
sional groups most directly affected. 
The setting, through consultations with representative experts, 
of decisional productivity standards deemed consistent with full elic­
itation and evaluation of testimony, data and arguments should be 
the beginning not the end of inquiries into whether good cause has 
been shown for dismissal of administrative law judges. The ade­
quacy of support services available to meet particular judges' needs 
for assistance must be a factor of consideration. Reasonable efforts 
must be made by the agency to accommodate those needs in accord­
ance with the judges' and not only the agency's perceptions. The 
professional quality of the written decisions by the judges against 
whom charges have been brought should also be appraised before 
any conclusion of "good cause" is reached. Panels of impartial ex­
perts selected from peer groups of administrative law judges, other 
distinguished members of the bench and bar and from law school 
faculties should be utilized to evaluate the quality of decisions by the 
charged judges. High quality could explain low productivity and 
would counsel against disciplinary action in those cases in which 
judges are charged with consistently falling below minimally accept­
able decisional outputs. Any judicial system that prizes quality 
should have room for judges who, by observing the ''write, rewrite, 
rewrite and rewrite" admonition of Ruhlen's manual,245 achieve 
high levels of soundness and clarity. Such practices might play hob 
with caseload disposition ifall the judges were perfectionists; but the 
same sense of reality that tells us that a judge who decides no cases 
should not be entitled "judge" also tells us that few judges are ad­
dicted to perfectionism. The few in service should be studied and 
treasured, not purged.246 
245. M. RUHLEN, supra note 214, at 95. 
246. Although there may well be points ofdivergence between the Board's analysis 
of good cause in the Goodman case, see supra tellt accompanying notes 175-81, and that 
presented in this anicle, it is submitted that the Board's ruling and rationale overall are 
compatible with and conducive to implementation of what this article concludes is the 
task at hand. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
"Good Cause" for removal of administrative law judges is 
stricter than "efficiency of the service," the standard used for the re­
moval of other classified civil service personnel, but not as strict as 
"good behavior," the constitutional standard governing removal of 
Article III judges. Improper conduct by a judge-soliciting or ac­
cepting bribes, for example-would justify removal under all three 
standards. Financial stringency leading to reductions in force would 
be a typical factor held to satisfy "good cause" and "efficiency of the 
service" but which would not comport with the constitutional stan­
dard of "good behavior." Failure to follow agency directives in 
decisionmaking provides justification for typical removals pursuant 
to the "efficiency of the service" standard but is prohibited from use 
as "good cause" for removal of administrative law judges. 
Failure quantitatively to meet a minimum or to stay within a 
maximum average disposition rate could, arguably, provide a rebut­
table presumption of good cause, if the rates have been determined 
for each agency through consultations with and recommendations by 
representative experts from the bench, bar and academia concerned 
with that agency's administrative adjudication, and if the agency has 
made reasonable effort to accommodate to particular judges' per­
ceived and expressed needs for assistance. Resolution 78-2 of the 
Administrative Conference suggests the procedural sine qua nons for 
establishing quantitative norms. Ruhlen's Manual for administra­
tive law judges suggests that thoroughness, clarity and recurrent 
rewritting of opinions are judicial assets. The Supreme Court's rul­
ings in Ramspeck , Bulz, and Campbell offer reminders, over a period 
of 30 years, of esteem for the role, performance and decisional inde­
pendence of administrative law judges. The task at hand is to en­
hance, not jeopardize, the warrant for esteem through cooperative 
formulation of fair and feasible productivity goals, maximization of 
assistance to meet the needs of administrative law judges in attaining 
and maintaining them, and integration of the judges' findings and 
critiques into the agencies' machinery for making and evaluating 
policy. 
